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ABORIGINAL CLAIMS TO CULTURAL PROPERTY IN




Although "aboriginal rights" has yet to be given a comprehensive
definition in Canadian law, most native peoples assert that aboriginal
rights include the right to govern their own people and their land and
its use. For many, the right of self-governance includes the right to
determine their own cultural priorities, identify what is and is not
essential to their cultural integrity and the survival of their heritage,
and exercise ownership rights over tribal cultural property. In Canada,
the desire to exercise control over cultural property has manifested
itself in several forms. Modern land claims agreements such as the
Nunavut Settlement Agreement' and the failed Dene/Metis Compre-
hensive Land Claim Agreement 2 provide for aboriginal participation
in future heritage resource management as well as federal assistance
in the repatriation of heritage resources. Museums and aboriginal
peoples are also cooperating in the development of repatriation, man-
agement, access, and custodial policies. A recent example of the com-
promise and cooperation approach is the Task Force Report on Museums
and First Peoples, which promotes a partnership relationship between
First Peoples and Canadian museums "guided by moral, ethical and
professional principles and not limited to areas of rights and interests
specified by law."' 3 Unfortunately, because of the complexity of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta, Edmonton,
Alberta, LL.M., 1989, University of British Columbia; LL.B., 1985, University of
Saskatchewen; B.A., 1982, University of Regina. The writer gratefully acknowledges
Dr. Michael Asch, Murray Marshall, Professor Bruce Ziff, Professor Noel Lyon, Dr.
Sandra Niessen, and Dr. Pat McCormack for their comments on earlier drafts of this
article.
1. Agreement in Principle Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and
Her Majesty in Right of Canada arts. 36, 37 (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs
and Northern Development, 1990) [hereinafter Nunavut Agreement-in-Principle].
2. Dene/Metis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement in Principle § 29 (Ottawa:
Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1988).
3. TAsK FORcE REPORT ON MusEums AND FatsT PEOPLES (Ottawa: Assembly of
First Nations and the Canadian Museums Association, 1992). The terms "First Nations"
and "First Peoples" are used interchangeably to refer to the original Indian and Inuit
Tribes of Canada and their descendants. Section 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982,
and schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.I.) 1982, ch. 11, defines the aboriginal
peoples of Canada as Indian, Inuit, and Metis. Canadian courts have recognized
aboriginal rights of Inuit and Indian peoples but have yet to address the issue of Metis
rights. This article focuses on Indian and Inuit rights.
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ownership issue and the conflicting priorities of aboriginal peoples and
the scientific community, claims for control of heritage resources have
also been raised before the courts.
4
In the United States, there has been substantial legislative reform.
For example, the United States Congress has enacted legislation to
protect American Indian religions and has amended heritage conser-
vation and museum legislation to account for aboriginal concerns
relating to the treatment of cultural propertys More recently, Congress
passed a repatriation bill calling for the return of human remains,
funerary objects, sacred objects, and other cultural property to origi-
nating native groups that establish sufficient cultural affiliation to the
object claimed. 6 State conservation legislation has also been subjected
to substantial revision.7 One of the questions currently asked by the
scientific community north of the forty-ninth parallel is whether the
claims of Canadian aboriginal peoples will result in similar reforms in
Canadian law.
4. Litigation in Canada to date has been very limited, but there has been a
substantial amount of litigation concerning sacred sites and sacred objects in the United
States. See, e.g., Mohawk Bands v. Glenbow-Alberta Inst., [1988] 3 C.N.L.R. 70 (Alta.
Q.B.); Seneca Nation v. Hammond, 3 Thompson & Cook (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) 347 (App.
Div. 1874); Journeycake v. Cherokee Nation, 28 Ct. Cl. 281 (1893), off'd, 155 U.S.
196 (1894); Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, 61 N.Y.S. 1027 (Sup. Ct. 1899); Johnson v.
Chilkat Village, 457 F. Supp. 384 (D. Alaska 1978).
5. See, e.g., American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (Supp.
V 1981); Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 470aa-47011
(West 1992); National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470w-6
(Supp. V 1981).
6. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-
3013 (1988); see also Walter R. Echo-Hawk, Museum Rights v. Indian Rights: Guidelines
for Assessing Competing Legal Interest in Native Cultural Resources, 14 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CuAoNE 457, 448-53 (1986); Bowden Blair, Indian Rights: Native Americans
Versus American Museums - A Battle For Artifacts, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 125, 133-
54 (1979); C. Dean Higginbotham, Native Americans Versus Archaeologists: The Legal
Issues, 10 AM. INmuaN L. REv. 91, 104-13 (1982); John E. Peterson II, Dance of the
Dead: A Legal Tango For Control Over Native American Skeletal Remains, 15 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 115, 135-46 (1989); Ostriech Lurie, Interim Report, A.A.A. Commission
on Native American Remains, ANTHROPoOGY NEWSLE-rER (Am. Anthropological Ass'n,
Washington, D.C.), April, 1990,.at 16; Dean B. Suagee, American Indian Religious
Freedom and Cultural Resources Management: Protecting Mother Earth's Caretakers,
10 AM. INDuAN L. Ray. 1, 17-57 (1982).
7. See, e.g., WAsH. Ray. CODE §§ 27.44.010-.020 (West 1988); CAL. STAT. § 5097.9
to -5097.99 (West 1988); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 7, § 38A (West 1986); see also Margaret
B. Bowman, The Reburial of American Skeletal Remains: Approaches to the Resolution
of Conflict, 13 HARv. ENvTL. L. Ray. 147, 196-207 (1989); Walter R. Echo-Hawk,
Tribal Efforts to Protect Against Mistreatment of Indian Dead: The Quest for Equal
Protection of the Laws, NARF LEGAL Ray. (Native American Rights Fund, Boulder,
Colo.), Winter 1988, at 1; Higginbotham, supra note 6, at 111-15; Peterson, supra note
6, at 143-46.
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A recent Canadian study grouped repatriation claims into three
categories: legal, moral, and use.8 Use claims relate to professional
standards and temporary use or control of objects in the museum's
custody. The category of moral claims assumes the ability to differ-
entiate between legal title and moral right. Moral claims focus on
contemporary ethical standards and concepts of fairness rather than
on acquisition and certainty of legal rights. An important question in
resolving moral claims is whether "past practices of acquisition are to
be judged by present moral or legal standards." 9 Legal claims are
concerned with certainty and proof of title to museum collections in
Canadian law. Each of these categories accepts the legitimacy (but not
necessarily the appropriateness) of legal right and the need to accom-
modate special concerns of culturally affiliated groups in the reduction
of claims.
This article examines legal claims and encourages an understanding
of their cultural dimensions. The primary objectives of this article are
to illustrate the complexity of the ownership issue and to encourage
governments and museums to reassess their perceived legal rights to
aboriginal cultural property. The author recognizes that the law is not
value neutral and that dividing claims to cultural property into "legal"
and "extralegal" packages is a fallacy. However, it is hoped that a
discussion of the limits and complications of the law will encourage
museums and aboriginal peoples to develop a new conceptual frame-
work for the negotiation of claims. Ideally, cross-cultural solutions
should be sought through a process which rejects the legal myth of
impartiality, critically assesses claims of legal right, and presumes
equality and respect for cultural differences. 0
Ownership of aboriginal cultural property no longer in the possession
of originating communities is uncertain. At one time, it might have
been argued that the combination of Canadian statutes and common
law placed title indisputably in the Crown and current custodians.
However, recent developments in Canadian aboriginal rights law gen-
erate compelling arguments that call into question certainty of title.
This article examines title claims in light of these developments. In
particular, it examines arguments derived from common law principles
of property law, heritage conservation legislation, and the doctrine of
8. See Michael M. Ames et al., Proposed Museum Policies for Ethnological
Collections and the Peoples They Represent, MUSE, Autumn 1988, at 47, 48.
9. Id.
10. For a critique of the rights, discourse, and cultural difference in Canadian law,
see generally Mary Ellen Turpel, Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Inter-
pretive Monopolies, Cultural Difference, CANADA HUNm.NR PGros YARBoOK 503 (1989-
90).
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aboriginal rights. Where provincial laws are at issue, the author focuses
on the province of Alberta to illustrate the arguments raised.
II. Property as a Socio-Economic Concept
Property law is a system of rules that governs legal relations between
peoples. The development and content of the system are dependent
upon the social context within which the system is formed. In this
way, the law of property is not "objective" or value neutral, nor does
it e.ist as a fixed or static system. Rather, the social mores and
priorities of a given society affect the formulation and reformulation
of property rules and the court's willingness to grant ownership rights
to one person (or group) over another."
In. the attempt to reconcile changing technology and social mores
with existing rules of property, Canadian courts are influenced by
various policy considerations closely linked to the rationalization of a
private property system; that is, a system that assumes all property is
capable of being owned by an individual. Underlying this system is
the philosophy of economic liberalism which encourages exploitation
of re-sources owned by individuals and minimal interference by the
state. An inherent assumption of economic liberalism is that the welfare
of individual owners as well as the community prospers with a "free
market," and the law of supply and demand ensures proper regulation
of price, production, and purchase of goods. The policy considerations
that courts have emphasized that conform with this particular world
view include:
(1) Certainty of tide - the need to know who is entitled to what
so that conflict can be avoided and productivity encouraged;
(2). Fairness - an evaluation necessarily linked to profits from one's
labor and investment;
(3) Economic productivity - the solution that will give rise to
measures that can be assessed in terms of profit and the generation
of new resources;
(4) Enforceability - the difficulty of enforcing the rules created
and the costs associated with enforcement;
(5) Labor theory - the notion that laborers and artisans should
have fairly extensive rights over the fruits of their labor; and
11. Ownership is the concept used in law to describe a legally enforceable bundle
of rights between people with respect to a tangible or intangible object. These rights
can be grouped under three broad headings: the right to physical use, the right to
enjoyment (e.g. income and services), and the right to management (e.g. sale, lease,
devise, and mortgage).
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(6) Personality and liberty theory - the notion that legal rules
should promote personality traits such as independence, assertiveness
and generosity.
2
Aboriginal property litigation challenges the court to accept the
validity of concepts of property that clash with these policies. Although
generalizations about native property systems are difficult because of
the diversity of customary tribal laws, it can be said that where claims
have been made to tribal property, real or personal, a collective concept
of property is often invoked. A collective ideology is one where access
to and use of resources is determined by the collective interests of
society as a whole. Disputes regarding use and control are not resolved
by an attempt to isolate an individual owner, but in a way that is
conducive to the well-being of the community. Ownership does not lie
with a particular individual, but with the community. However, indi-
vidual members of the collective may acquire superior rights to, or
responsibilities for, part of the collective property. In such cases, a
trust responsibility may arise, as in the case where sacred moveable
property is held and used by the religious leaders of a tribe.
A communal system is similar to a collective system. However,
individuals within a communal system cannot acquire special rights to
any part of the community property vis-A-vis other members of that
community. All resources are available to all individuals in like shares.
The characteristics of communal property are explained in the United
States decision of Journeycake v. Cherokee Nation3 as follows:
The distinctive characteristic of [tribal] communal property
is that every member of the community is an owner of it
as such. He does not take as heir, or purchaser, or grantee;
if he dies his right of property does not descend; if he
removes from the community it expires; if he wishes to
dispose of it he has nothing which he can convey; and yet
he has a right of property in the land as perfect as that of
any other person; and his children after him will enjoy all
that he enjoyed, not as heirs but as communal owners.' 4
12. There are numerous discussions on the rationale of private property systems.
See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RuTGERs L. REv. 357 (1954);
Jeremy Waldron, What is Private Property?, 5 OxFoRD J.L.S. 313 (1985). For a
discussion of these concepts as applied to emerging concepts of property see International
News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); Moore v. Regents of the Univ.
of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1990); Victoria
Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co. v. Taylor, 58 C.L.R. 479 (Austl. 1937); Arnold
S. Weinrub, Information and Property, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1988).
13. 28 Ct. Cl. 281 (1893).
14. Id. at 302.
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The concepts of collective and communal property are not completely
foreign to Canadian property law. Dr. Leroy Little Bear's suggests
that the native concept of property is "somewhat akin to a joint
tenancy: the members of a tribe have an undivided interest in land;
everybody, as a whole, owns the whole."'16 Although a useful analogy
in the attempt to translate one world view to another, the Canadian
concept of joint tenancy is not sufficient to capture the holistic native
concept of property as the joint tenancy is a unit of individual own-
ership. The concept of joint tenancy recognizes a fictitious unity of
persons that can label property as "mine" and assert property rights
against other individual members of a given society. Further, a joint
tenant is recognized as having an individual right of alienation with
respect to his or her interest in the joint tenancy and individual joint
tenants can sever the tenancy.
A other useful analogy may be drawn from the law of contracts.
Agreements can be entered into that divide property interests among
a collective and restrict rights of use in ways that benefit the collective.
Applying this concept to a sacred tribal object, one can envision an
implied social contract that the religious laws of the tribe determine
individual rights, obligations, and consequences of breach in a manner
beneficial to the tribe as a whole. The contract may be extended to
include living things other than humans, such as animals and plants,
and objects that Western society would view as inanimate. An object
with its own living spirit becomes a party to the contract, rather than
the subject of ownership.
7
Although analogies can be drawn to help translate aboriginal con-
cepts of property into Canadian legal language, we must question the
appropriateness of imposing cultural values embedded in our legal
system on the resolution of aboriginal claims. The concept of com-
munal or collective property combined with aboriginal visions of the
sacred creates a system of relationships that are very different from
those found in the Canadian legal tradition and are difficult for
15. Dr. Leroy Little Bear is a Professor of Native Studies at the University of
Lethbridge. Recently he has served as a member of the Cawsey Task Force on the
CrimEnal Justice System and its impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta. He
is also part of the legal team of the Assembly of First Nations and has assisted in the
current constitutional negotiations for an amendment to reorganize and define an
inherent right of aboriginal self-government in the Canadian Constitution.
16. Dr. Leroy Little Bear, A Concept of Native Title, CASNP BULLETIN, (Can.
Ass'n in Support of Native Peoples, Toronto, Can.), Dec. 1976, at 33, quoted in
BRAD.FORD W. MoasE, ABoRIGiNAL PEOPLES AND THE LAw 50-51 (1985). The concept
of joint tenancy developed in the context of land law. However, Canadian law also
recognizes joint ownership of personal property. See, e.g., Watt v. Watt Estate, 28
E.T.R. 9 (Man. Ct. App. 1987).
17. Little Bear, supra note 16, has used the social contract analogy to explain the
native concept of land ownership and the extension of rights to all living things.
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decision makers influenced by Christianity and Western legal ideology
to understand. Again, noting the danger of attempts to generalize
native spirituality, most aboriginal societies adopt a holistic world view
which recognizes a special relationship between people and the natural
world. The earth is commonly conceived of as a living being which
gives life to other living things and upon which the survival of all
living things depends.18 Objects created by people may also be infused
with a living spirit.
This view of the sacred results in an evaluation of property and
relationships that extends far beyond notions of ownership, profit, and
utility. The attempt to frame the relationship of a person to other
concepts such as guardian, steward, or caregiver may be more appro-
priate than to owner or custodian. Further, it becomes inappropriate
to treat legal, political, cultural, religious, and other relationships as
distinct relationships. In a world view where land is sacred and the
people belong to the land, the significance of cultural artifacts cannot
be understood if claims to artifacts are compartmentalized. As an
illustration of this perspective, Dean Suagee offers the following com-
ment on sacred objects:
Many rituals and ceremonies are concerned with giving
thanks for food and other subsistence needs that Mother
Earth provides to those who hunt, fish, gather, and/or raise
crops. There is an element of stewardship in the perform-
ance of such rituals because they are seen as necessary to
ensure that the plants, animals, birds, and fish will continue
to flourish and make themselves available for human needs.
The correct performance of these rituals requires the use of
sacred objects made from sacred plants, animals, and min-
eral materials. The manner of performing a ritual or cere-
mony, the sacred site at which it is to be performed, and
in some cases the time for performance, are strictly pre-
scribed. 9
18. Suagee, supra note 6, at 10; Turpel, supra note 10, at 517; JACK WOODWARD,
NAXrvE LAw 339-40 (1990).
19. Suagee, supra note 6, at 10. Repatriation of the Zuni War Gods from various
American museums by Zuni leaders provides an excellent illustration of this point in
the context of repatriation claims. The War Gods are wooden carvings, frequently
adorned by eagle feathers and used by the Zuni for ceremonial purposes. After the
ceremony, the carvings are placed on specific mountain peaks where they continue to
serve a religious purpose. It is intended that the War Gods decompose and once again
become part of the earth. Preservation results in an imbalance in the spiritual world.
There are many accounts of the religious significance of the War Gods and attempts
by the Zuni to recover War Gods from museums and other custodians. See, e.g., Blair,
supra note 6, at 126-28.
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Canadian law has recognized collective rights in the context of
aboriginal title claims. "Aboriginal title" is the phrase used to describe
the collective ownership rights of aboriginal groups to their traditional
lands. Claims to aboriginal title can be advanced only by an organized
group of aboriginal people.2° Whether the concept of collective own-
ership will be extended by Canadian courts to moveable cultural
property is yet to be determined. Canadian courts have had very recent
and limited exposure to claims for aboriginal moveable cultural prop-
erty. The only case that the author is aware of is the attempt by the
Mohawk Bands of Kahnawake, Akwesasne, and Kanesatake to recover
tribal property displayed by the Glenbow-Alberta Institute in the 1988
Spirit Sings exhibition. 21 This repatriation case was carried to the
interim injunction stage, but did not go to trial.
Recognizing the complexity of the issues raised, Justice Shannon
initially granted an "interim interim" injunction in favor of the Mo-
hawk for a period of two weeks, but subsequently concluded that the
Mohawk could not meet the requisite legal tests for the issuance of
an :interim injunction pending trial. In Justice Shannon's opinion, the
claim to ownership of tribal cultural property was a serious issue to
be tried, but the plaintiffs could not show that irreparable harm would
result from the display of the False Face Mask as part of the defen-
dant's exhibition. Emphasizing that the mask had been on display in
various museums for many years and that the Mohawk had not
objected to these displays in the past, Justice Shannon was not con-
vinced that the continued display of the mask would cause the Mohawk
irreparable harm.
According to the Mohawk, however, the False Face Mask is a sacred
object and an inherent part of the spiritual practices of the Mohawk
Nation. It represents the shared power of the original medicine beings
and is intended for use by the medicine societies of the Six Nations
Confederacy. In their view, ekhibiting the Mask violated its intended
sacred purpose, constituted desecration of it, and falsely ridiculed and
misrepresented the spiritual beliefs and practices of the Iroquois. 2
20. See, e.g., Calder v. British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313, 328 (Can.); Guerin
v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 376 (Can.); Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of
Indian Affairs & Northern Dev., 107 D.L.R.3d 513, 542-43 (Fed. Ct. 1979); see also
Brian Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights, 66 CAN. BAR REV. 727, 754-59 (1987).
21. Mohawk Bands v. Glenbow-Alberta Inst., [1988] 3 C.N.L.R. 70 (Alta. Q.B.).
22. Id. at 71.
23. The interim decision is not reported. Justice Shannon's reasons for refusing to
grant an interim injunction are reported in Mohawk Bands, [1988] 3 C.N.L.R. at 71.
See also Affidavit of Chiefs Billy Two-Rivers, John Bud Morris, Eugene Montour and
Grand Chief Joseph Tehokheron Norton; Statement of Claim of the Mohawk Bands
of Kahnawake, Akwesasne, and Kanesatake et al.; Statement of Defence of the Glenbow-
Alberta Institute; Statement of Defence and Counterclaim of the Defendant Royal
Ontario Museum; and Statement of Defence to Counterclaim of Royal Ontario Museum,
all filed in Mohawk Bands (No. 8801-00657).
46.4
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From the Mohawk perspective there was past harm, present harm,
and continuing harm, all of which were irreparable.
Although this case illustrates the difficulty of reconciling competing
world views in the legal forum, one should not assume that Canadian
courts will not reformulate the rules of property to accommodate an
aboriginal perspective. Despite its firm roots in the private property
rationale, Canadian law is unique in that it often seeks to find a
compromise between liberal ideologies that promote the rights of
individuals and collective concerns that promote the welfare of com-
munities. 24 The balancing of aboriginal collective claims and individual
rights claims of non-aboriginals to aboriginal property has historically
weighed against aboriginal interests. However, the use of collective
legal language by the courts, the growing awareness of the ethnocentric
interpretation of rights, the constitutional recognition of aboriginal
rights, and the infusion of notions such as honor and duty into
aboriginal rights discourse suggests that the scales are slowly beginning
to tip in favor of aboriginal peoples.
Although the clash of cultures continues to result in lengthy, expen-
sive, and complicated litigation at the lower levels, decisions are being
rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada that further the cause of
aboriginal peoples. At this point, one can only speculate whether recent
developments will expand to accommodate all property claims of
aboriginal peoples. However, given the infusion of private property
ideology in Canadian law, there is no doubt that the court will give
some weight to factors such as the cost of care incurred by current
custodians and the need for certainty of title in the resolution of
repatriation claims.
III. Common Law Property Analysis
A. Original Ownership
First possession is the organizing principle of ownership rights under
the common law. Historically, this meant possession was accepted as
prima facie evidence of title, and loss of possession resulted in loss of
title. Possession originally meant physical control, but today, legal
possession also includes the intent to exercise dominion over the thing
possessed.2 The presumption that possession is proof of title remains,
24. An illustration of this feature in property law is state power of expropriation
and limits placed by tort law on the ability to deal with property in a way that causes
harm to others.
25. This theory is encapsulated in the common law maxim "possession is the root
of title." See generally Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L.
REv. 1221 (1979); Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Cm. L.
REv. 73 (1985); E.L.G. TYLm, N.E. PAumER, & J xEs CRossL-Y VAxis, 5 PEssoxA
PROPERTY 47-55 (1973) [hereinafter VA.;Es].
465
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but it can be displaced by documents evidencing title (such as a bill
of sale), proof of prior possession, or statutory law.
It will not be difficult for the Canadian court to work with the
original ownership theory to trace first possession of an aboriginal
artifact to individual acts of creation or title through a chain of
subsequent losses and acquisitions. Where the conceptual framework
breaks down is in the context of group claims to communal or tribal
property. The concept of communal or collective property assumes a
theory of ownership which places property rights relating to objects
produced by, or originating from, the community in the community,
independent of individual acts of creation, possession, loss, and trans-
fer.26 Further, it is unlikely that the claimant aboriginal group will be
comprised of the same membership that existed at the time of the
creation, transfer, or loss of the cultural property at issue. Conse-
quently, some form of historical tracing to an ancestral group will be
necessary to establish prior ownership and the requisite cultural affil-
iation necessary to assert a claim. Finally, because the common law
has yet to develop a comprehensive framework for communal own-
ership of personal property, judges will need to look outside their
existing supply of legal tools to determine how communal cultural
property is to be distinguished from individual property, what bundle
of rights are associated with communal ownership, and what rights
individuals have vis-i-vis communal property.
Communal title to personal property has been incorporated into
property systems similar to the Canadian system. For example, the
United States courts have adapted principles of common law to con-
cude that individual members of a tribe cannot transfer title to
property held for the common use of the tribe.27 More recently, the
United State Congress gave legislative recognition to communal prop-
erty rights in the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act (NAGPRA). 28 The Act sets "standards, conditions and definitions
under which Native American human remains, funerary objects, sacred
objects, and objects of cultural patrimony might be repatriated from
federally funded museums and federal agencies, based on recorded
inventories and/or summaries by affected museums of their collections
26. See Affidavit of Chiefs Billy Two-Rivers, John Bud Morris, Eugene Montour
and Grand Chief Joseph Tehokheron Norton at para. 9, Mohawk Bands (No. 8801-
00657) ("exclusive right, title and interest in and to all artifacts produced by or in any
way originating from Mohawks and the right to control use of the artifacts" is attributed
to the Mohawk Nation).
27. See, e.g., Journeycake v. Cherokee Nation, 28 Ct. Cl. 281, 302 (1893); On-
ondaga Nation v. Thacher, 61 N.Y.S. 1027, 1028 (Sup. Ct. 1899); Echo-Hawk, supra
note 6, at 441-45; Peterson, supra note 6, at 130-32.
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containing such material. ' 29 Cultural patrimony is defined in the leg-
islation as follows:
an object having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural
importance central to the Native American group or culture
itself, rather than property owned by an individual Native
American, and which, therefore, cannot be alienated, ap-
propriated, or conveyed by any individual regardless of
whether or not the individual is a member of an Indian
tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and such object shall
have been considered inalienable by such Native American
group at the time the object was separated from the
group .... 30
Given international trends, Canadian recognition of collective rights
to aboriginal title, and the movement in aboriginal rights law to define
aboriginal rights in their own terms, it is unlikely that the assertion
of collective or communal rights will act as a major stumbling block
in repatriation claims. The common law concept of ownership is easily
expanded to accommodate this concept. If the courts are reluctant to
help aboriginals regain control of cultural property that has yet to be
discovered or that is currently in the possession of non-aboriginal
custodians, easier methods are available to the courts to deny repatri-
ation claims, such as the application of heritage conservation and
provincial legislation which require that actions for the recovery of
personal property be brought within a certain period of time.
3'
Aboriginal claims to cultural property may be measured against the
rights of landowners and occupiers. At common law, articles lying on
the surface of the land are presumed to be owned by the occupier of
the land if the occupier can prove a manifest intention to exercise
control over the land and things upon it32 Landowners are presumed
to own articles attached to or under their land, even if they are not
aware of the presence of the object. 33 These presumptions can be
displaced by proof of prior possession or ownership and proof that
prior rights have not been lost through abandonment, transfer, or
some other means.
34
29. See generally Geoffrey Platt Jr., The Repatriation Law Ends One Journey -
But Opens a New Road, MUSEum NEws, Jan./Feb. 1991, at 91.
30. 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (Supp. IV 1992).
31. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 67-77, 94-104. The federal gov-
ernment is also proposing heritage conservation legislation.
32. See, e.g., Parker v. British Airways Bd., [1982] 2 W.L.R. 503, 511 (Eng. C.A.).
33. Id. at 514.
34. In the United States, native peoples receive some assistance in meeting this
onus of proof through the following provision in the United States Code:
In all trials about the right of property in which an Indian may be a party
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Skeletal remains have been treated differently from other objects
buried in the land because full ownership rights cannot be exercised
over dead bodies and human skeletal remains. Dead bodies have been
treated as a form of quasi property. An "individual can possess certain
rights in a dead body, such as control and disposition after death, but
does not have the whole 'bundle of rights' granted to an owner of
other property.'s This special treatment of dead bodies has resulted
in the development of laws preventing interference with grave sites. In
Canada, control and protection of grave sites is regulated by provincial
cemeteries legislation. However, ancient burial grounds of aboriginal
peoples no longer used by aboriginal groups have not been drawn into
the protection of cemeteries legislation. Rather, ancient burial grounds
have been treated as an archaeological resource, capable of transfer
and ownership.1
6
In the absence of evidence of abandonment, the United States
recognizes property rights of descendant aboriginal groups to ancestral
burial grounds.3 7 Further, consultation with descendant groups con-
cerning the proper excavation and treatment of skeletal remains is
legislated.3s Rights to human remains in the custody of federal mu-
seums has also been addressed. For example, NAGPRA establishes
conditions for the return of human remains to aboriginal groups that
can establish a lineal or cultural affiliation.3 9 A few states have enacted
similar legislation, but it is exceptional for such legislation to extend
to private museums.40
In Canada, government officials and members of the scientific com-
munity are beginning to work cooperatively with aboriginal groups to
develop policies and legislation for the proper treatment, care, and
on one side, and a white person on the other, the burden of proof shall
rest upon the white person, whenever the Indian shall make out a pre-
sumption of title in himself from the fact of previous possession or
ownership.
25 U.S.C.A. § 194 (West 1992).
35. See Bowman, supra note 7, at 167. The law relating to property in the human
body is in a state of flux. See generally Diana Brahams, Bailment and Donation of
Parts of the Human Body, 139 NEW L.J. 80 (1989); Randy W. Marusyk & Margaret
S. Swain, A Question of Property Rights in the Human Body, 21 OTTAWA L. REv. 351
(1989); Stephen Ashley Mortinger, Spleen for Sale: Moore v. Regents of the University
of California and the Right to Sell Parts of Your Body, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 499 (1990).
36. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 113-20.
37. See Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601 (La. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 498 So.
2d 753 (La. 1986).
38. See supra notes 6-7.
39. 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (Supp. IV 1992).
40. See supra note 7.
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return of human remains. For example, the University of Alberta
recently agreed to return skeletal remains excavated from the Sharp-
head burial site near Ponoka, Alberta, but the claimants failed to
recover the remains, so they are still maintained as part of the Univ-
ersity's collection.41 Other examples of cooperation are the burial site
provisions negotiated in the northern land claims agreements, consul-
tation with native peoples on proposed legislation to be enacted in the
province of British Columbia which provides that inalienable and
inprescriptable ownership of native human remains and grave goods
will be vested in the native people of British Columbia and federal
consultation with aboriginal groups in the development of proposed
legislation that requires consultations with the representatives of the
deceased prior to excavation of burial sites.42
B. Transfer and Acquisition of Ownership Interests
Most owners of personal property are not original owners. Rather,
title is acquired through various methods. Rights in personal property
are most commonly terminated and transferred through gifts and
contracts of exchange or sale. However, rights can also be lost through
abandonment, intermixture, accession, confusion, and the application
of limitation of actions legislation.
1. Donation, Sale, and Exchange
A fundamental principle of donation, sales, and exchanges is the
doctrine of nemo dat quad non habet.43 According to this doctrine, a
person cannot transfer greater rights in the property than she or he
has." Tribal property donated or sold by individual members of a
41. Interview with John Priegert, Curator, Archaeological Survey of Alberta (Jan.
16, 1991).
42. See supra note 2. See also Yukon Comprehensive Land Claim Umbrella Final
Agreement ch. 13 (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs & N. Dev., 1990); Draft
Heritage Conservation Act § 28(5), in HERITAGE LEGISLATION: A WHIrE PAPER FOR
PuBLc REvIEW (B.C. Ministry of Mun. Affairs, Recreation & Culture 1991); GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 9, 1991, at C-2; and Communications Canada, Marcel Masse
Tables Draft Archaeological Bill, Seeks Comment from Interested Groups (Dec. 19,
1990) (news release FI-90-3818F).
43. He who hath not cannot give.
44. VAINEs, supra note 25, at 159-61. There are some legislated exceptions to the
rule that may arise in a particular fact pattern, such as sales in an open market. A
detailed analysis of these exceptions is beyond the scope of this article. However, one
of the most important limitations is contained in legislation which requires that actions
for recovery of personal property are brought within a defined time period. This
legislation is discussed infra text accompanying notes 67-77 of this article.
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group or stolen from an aboriginal group is frequently the subject of
repatriation claims.4 The central issue in these claims is the capacity
of the individual to transfer title. The common law concerning title to
stolen property is clear. A thief, or anyone claiming rights through a
thief, cannot assert property rights against a prior owner or possessor.46
The doctrine of nemo dat protects the rights of the prior possessor.
The refusal to return stolen property, absent legislative intervention,
is a conversion of the property which gives rise to civil and criminal
liability.47 Purchasing or receiving the object in good faith without
knowledge that the object is stolen is no defense, but it may give the
purchaser a remedy against the seller. Further, equity may recognize
some entitlement to compensation for the cost of caring for and storing
the object.
The same analysis can be applied to an individual member of a tribe
who sells or donates .tribal property without the consent of the tribe.
The definition of proper consent may be an issue. For example, an
indfvidual may have the consent of the local band council, but not of
the religious leaders, to sell a sacred item. The court will have to
determine whether the consent is valid and whether it prevents the
tribe from reclaiming the property. Once lack of consent is established,
nerno dat operates to prohibit the transfer of ownership rights by
individuals, regardless of the purchaser's innocence. The effect of nemo
dat in this context is described by the New York Supreme Court in
Seneca Nation of Indians v. Hammond" as follows:
The bark in question.., was the property of the plaintiffs.
Those who purchased it from individual Indians got no
title, and they could confer none to the defendants. Eve-
rybody who meddled with the bark became a trespasser. It
is no defense that the defendants acted for others in buying
the bark, or that they purchased it without notice that their
vendors had no title: or that their acts, of which the plain-
tiffs complain, were done in good faith. 49
4.5. See Statement of Defence and Counterclaim of the Defendant Royal Ontario
Museum, Mohawk Bands v. Olenbow-Alberta Inst., [1988] 3 C.N.L.R. 70 (No. 8801-
00657). The defense raised by the Royal Ontario Museum in the Spirit Sings litigation
is that the False Face Mask was donated to the Museum in accordance with the terms
of the owner's will. See also Mohawk Bands v. Glenbow-Alberta Inst., (1988] 3 C.N.L.R.
70 (Alta. Q.B.). See discussion supra note 6 of American case law by Echo-Hawk and
Blair.
46. This conclusion is derived from the general rule that a person cannot transfer
title greater than he or she has, in absence of legislated interference. See supra note 44.
47. For a general discussion of conversion, see RALPH L. SuMONDS & GEORO R.
STEW.RT, STUnY PAPER oN WRONGFUL INTERFERENCE WITH GooDs 20-28 (1989) and
VArEs, supra note 25, at 19-21, 159.
48. 3 Thompson & Cook (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) 347 (App. Div. 1874).
49. Id. at 349; see also Echo-Hawk, supra note 6, at 441-44.
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If cultural property is transferred with the authority of the group,
principles of contract law may still vitiate the contract if the plaintiff
can establish undue influence, mistake, or fraud. 0 The availability of
these arguments will depend upon the facts of a particular acquisition
such as speculation in native artifacts, pressure sales, misinformation,
inadequate compensation, economic deprivation, and threatened dis-
integration of native communities. Given these factors, a court may
conclude that the parties lacked equality of bargaining power and find
a way to avoid the contract.
The problem faced by aboriginal claimants is proving historical facts
when witnesses to the actual circumstances of the sale are deceased.
The court is left to speculate what "might have been" based on oral
histories and expert testimony. Consequently, in absence of clear evi-
dence of fraud or undue influence, it is unlikely that such claims would
be successful.
2. Abandonment
An owner or possessor of chattels can divest himself or herself of
ownership or possessory rights through abandonment. Abandonment
must be voluntary and accompanied by the intent to divest of own-
ership rights. Leaving goods, misplacing goods, or forgetting to recover
goods is not enough to constitute abandonment. Abandoned goods
are subject to the first in time rule; that is, the first person to possess
the goods after they are abandoned has best title to them. An example
of the application of abandonment to repatriation claims is the case
of the Zuni War Gods. Once Zuni War Gods are used for ceremonial
purposes, they are left at the mercy of the environment in a place
designated by the tribe. Although the War Gods may appear to have
been abandoned to the discoverer, they have not been abandoned
because the Zuni did not intend to divest themselves of all rights in
the War Gods and allow the first person who discovers them to acquire
ownership rights. Rather, the exposure of the War Gods to the envi-
ronment is an intentional religious practice.5 ' Because the War Gods
are not abandoned, the Zuni should have superior rights to a finder
and persons claiming through a finder, based on principles of first
possession.
The Louisiana Court of Appeals recently considered the doctrine of
abandonment as applied to aboriginal burial sites and funerary objects
in the decision of Charrier v. Bell.52 This case involved materials
recovered from approximately 150 burial sites at the Trudeau Planta-
50. See generally Echo-Hawk, supra note 6.
51. See supra note 19.
52. 496 So. 2d 601 (La. Ct. App. 1986); see also Peterson, supra note 6, at 133-
35; Blair, supra note 6, at 133-35; Bowman, supra note 7, at 170-74.
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tion in Louisiana. The remains were unearthed between 1968 and 1971
by an amateur archaeologist (Charrier) who attempted to sell them to
Harvard's Peabody Museum. The museum leased some skeletal remains
and artifacts but did not purchase them, as museum officials doubted
Charier's ability to convey legal title. As a result, Charrier sued for
a declaration that he had title arising from finding the abandoned
goods. The claims of landowners were not at issue as the State had
intervened in 1978 and purchased both the relevant land and artifacts
from the landowners. In 1981, the United States Bureau of Indian
Affairs recognized the Tunica and Boloxi Indians as tribes which
resulted in the state subordinating its claim to the artifacts to the
Indians. As a result, the contest for ownership rights was between
Charrier as finder and the Tunica and Boloxi Indians as descendants
of the deceased and prior possessors of the burial sites.
The trial court held that the Indians were the owners of the skeletal
remains and the funerary objects.53 The Court of Appeals upheld this
decision, finding that the common law of abandonment does not apply
to burial materials.m As the doctrine of abandonment is the same in
both the United States and Canada, this decision may be significant
in Canada. The court reasoned that the Tunica and Boloxi did not
intend to abandon the body of a tribal member and the objects buried
with it upon burial. 5 After hearing extensive expert testimony on the
history of the area, the question of duress causing abandonment of
the area, and the burial practices of the Indians, the court explained
the lack of divesting intent necessary for abandonment as follows:
However, the fact that the descendants or fellow tribesmen
of the deceased Tunica Indians resolved, for some custom-
ary, religious or spiritual belief, to bury certain items along
with the bodies of the deceased, does not result in a con-
clusion that the goods were abandoned. While the relin-
quishment of immediate possession may have been proved,
an objective viewing of the circumstances and intent of
relinquishment does not result in a finding of abandonment.
Objects may be buried with a descendant for any number
of reasons. The relinquishment of possession normally serves
some spiritual, moral, or religious purpose of the descen-
dant/owner, but is not intended as a means of relinquishing
ownership to a stranger. Plaintiff's argument carried to its
logical conclusion would render a grave subject to despoli-
ation either immediately after interment or definitely after
53. Charrier, 496 So. 2d at 602.
54. Id. at 605.
5:5. Id. at 604.
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removal of the descendants of the deceased from the neigh-
bourhood of the cemeterym
Charrier may not be extended to support the general principle that
natives showing sufficient biological and cultural links to burial sites
own all archaeological material buried in those sites. The Charrier
decision is based on a chain-of-title analysis. Therefore, a slight vari-
ation of the facts could sever a link in the chain.
3. Intermixture, Accession, and Alteration
Owners may also lose ownership rights through intermixtures, ac-
cessions, and alterations of goods. Intermixture occurs when there is
a confusion of goods owned by different persons such that the property
of each can no longer be distinguished. Entitlement to commingled
goods will vary depending on a number of factors such as the kind,
quality, and quantity of the goods; the proportions contributed; the
circumstances through which the intermixture came about (e.g., neg-
ligence or deliberate action by one of the owners); and principles of
fairness and practicality. The court generally attempts to avoid granting
rights to a wrongdoer and to protect rights of innocent third parties.5
The related doctrines of accession and alteration are also influenced
by the concept of fairness. The doctrine of accession applies when an
object of lesser value is attached to one of greater value than the
principal chattel owned by someone else. The general rule is that the
accession follows the title of the principle thing to which it is attached.
The central issue here is whether there has been an accession. The
most commonly applied tests for accession are the injurious removal
and destruction of utility tests. The former asks whether the lesser
chattel can be removed without seriously injuring the whole. If the
answer is yes, there is no accession. The utility test asks whether
removal will destroy the utility of the principle chattel. If the answer
is yes, there is an accession. The test adopted by the court tends to
vary, depending on the identification of the parties and the involvement
of innocent parties.
58
Alteration occurs when property is converted into a different species.
The operator or person who converts the substance becomes the owner
of the newly created property and is liable to the former proprietor
for the value of the substance converted. An example of alteration is
the conversion of grapes to wine.59 Provincial legislators have inter-
56. Id. at 604-05.
57. VA TEs, supra note 25, at 434-35; Jones v. De Marchant, [1916] 10 W.W.R.
841 (Man. C.A.).
58. V wEs, supra note 25, at 430-34; Firestone Tire v. Indus. Acceptance Corp.,
[19711 1 S.C.R. 357 (Can.).
59. VAmIs, supra note 25, at 430-34.
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vened in this area to protect material suppliers and repair people
through the right to a lien. 60
Issues of intermixture, accession, and alteration may arise if a
museum has restored cultural property in poor physical condition or
if property has been attached to, or commingled with, other cultural
patrimony for the purposes of display or storage. For example, a
museum may acquire a ceremonial headdress in poor physical condi-
tion. Rather than dispose of it, the museum may recreate the original
using new materials and imitating the aboriginal technique of construc-
tion. Does the accession of new materials and labor introduced by the
museum render the headdress museum property? Many factors will
have to be considered including the cultural value of the headdress,
the monetary value of the headdress prior to restoration, the necessity
of restoration, adequacy of compensation, and the method of original
acquisition. (Rights originally acquired through a wrongdoer will not
be superior to those of a previous owner or possessor.) Finally, it
should be noted that the lines between the doctrines of alteration,
accession, and intermixture are not clearly drawn which means the
court may adopt whichever doctrine is best suited to render the out-
come the court considers most just.
6'
4. Finding
The loss of property does not necessarily result in the loss of
ownership rights. A finder of lost or misplaced goods acquires rights
enforceable against the whole world except a prior owner or possessor.
The onus of proof lies with the person challenging the title of the
finder or person in possession. Mere discovery of an object imposes
no rights or duties on a finder. However, once the finder assumes
control of the object, he or she is obliged to keep the object safe and
to take reasonable steps to return it to the prior possessor.
62
The rights of persons acquiring title through finding are measured
against the rights of prior possessors and landowners. If finding occurs
on privately-owned land and the object is unattached, the finder has
superior rights to the occupier of the land unless the occupier has a
manifest intention to exercise control over the land and the things
upon it. The requisite intention can be express or implied from the
circumstances. For example, a finding on land where the occupier has
allowed unrestricted access and a finding on land surrounded by "no
60. See, e.g., Possessory Lien Act, R.S.A. ch. P-13, § 2 (1980).
61. See Jones v. De Merchant, [1916] 10 W.W.R. 841 (Man. C.A.).
62. Parker v. British Airways Bd., [1982] 2 W.L.R. 503, 514 (1982) (Eng. C.A.);
see generally T.J. Follows, Parker v. British Airways Board and the Law of Finding of
Chatte!, 12 KiNGSTON L. REv. 1 (1982).
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trespass" signs may lead to different results. The former practice
suggests a lack of intent to control and the latter, posting of signs,
the opposite.
However, these circumstances will be considered along with other
factors and might not be determinative of the issue. As discussed
above, title to objects in or under the land are presumed to be owned
by the landowner or occupier. A landowner or occupier who does not
object has greater rights than a prior possessor to objects found on
or under her land unless the object is abandoned. Consequently, title
obtained from landowners and finders, or persons claiming through
them, is uncertain. Landowners and occupiers have the same obliga-
tions to the original owner as a finder.
In the chain of possessory title, a finder who acquires property by
committing a wrongful act, such as trespass, may still acquire rights
enforceable against subsequent possessors if the property is not claimed
by a prior possessor. For example, if a museum purchases an artifact
from X, who stole it from Y, who acquired the artifact by trespassing
on the lands of Z, Y can assert better title to the artifact than the
museum. However, if the owner of the land or another prior possessor
of the artifact asserts a claim, those rights would be superior to the
rights of the trespasser. 63
5. Objects Confiscated by Law
Brief mention should be made of title to objects confiscated pursuant
to laws which today would be considered racist, unethical, or uncon-
stitutional. An example, of such a law is the anti-potlatch provision
contained in the Indian Act 4 from 1866 until 1951.65 The potlatch was
a ceremonial feast performed by certain tribes of the West Coast. It
involved the use and exchange of ceremonial property. Pursuant to
the anti-potlatch law, participants were arrested and their ceremonial
property confiscated. Some of the confiscated items were placed in
museums and have been the subject of repatriation negotiations. 6 If
the anti-potlatch law was invalid at the time of enactment, arguably
nemo dat would apply and the confiscating government could not
63. See, e.g., Bird v. Fort Frances, [1949] 2 D.L.R. 791, 799 (Ont. H.C.).
64. Indian Act, R.S.C. ch. 43, § 114.
65. See WooDwARD, supra note 18, at 341.
66. One of the most famous extralegal repatriation claims involves the Museum of
Civilization and the Kwakiutl Potlatch collection. In this case, ceremonial objects were
seized in 1922 and given in part to the National Museum. After years of negotiations,
the objects were returned to the Northwest Coast to be housed in federally funded and
Kwakiutl-operated museums. See Brian Shein, Playing Pretending, Being Real, CANAUN.
ART, Spring, 1987, at 76; Carole Henderson Carpenter, Secret, Precious Things: Re-
patriation of Potlatch Art, ART MAoAzrNs, May/June 1981, at 64.
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transfer title to third parties. However, if the law was valid, a court
may reduce the question of entitlement to confiscated property to an
ethical or political question.
C. Limitation of Actions
The above discussion illustrates that the common law rules of ac-
quisition and loss of ownership rights give rise to uncertainty of title.
Without legislated interference, current possessors would always risk
title challenges by prior possessors. In order to provide for greater
ceitainty of title, encourage prompt settlement of disputes, and protect
reasonable expectations of innocent purchasers, most provinces have
introduced limitation of actions legislation. This legislation requires
prior possessors to bring property actions before the courts within a
specified time.67 Limitation periods may be the greatest stumbling block
for aboriginal peoples bringing repatriation claims. Consequently, it is
important to consider the potential impact of limitation periods and
their application to aboriginal peoples. The latter issue will be ad-
dressed in the examination of aboriginal rights below.
Section 51 of the Alberta Limitation of Actions Act provides that
actions for trespass, conversion, taking away, or detention of chattels
must be brought within two years after the cause of action arises.
68
The cause of action arises on the date of the interference with the
chattel. While some provincial statutes provide that the title of the
original owner is extinguished once the designated period expires, the
Alberta legislation is silent on that point. 69 Consequently, it is unclear
whether the failure to bring an action within two years operates to
extinguish the rights of the prior possessor or if it merely deprives the
owner/possessor of a right of action in court. This issue is significant
because the common law remedy of recaption may not be affected by
the Act if title is not extinguished. 70
Recaption is the right to recover property without the aid of judicial
process. 71 It assumes the recaptor has superior title to the recaptee. It
is usually asserted as a defense to an action rather than as a remedy.
For example, if goods are wrongfully taken (e.g., fraud or theft) or
wrongfully detained (e.g., possessor claims through a person who does
not have the capacity to transfer title), recaption may be a defense to
trespass if entry and repossession is peaceable. The recaptor will not
be civilly or criminally liable if she or he establishes better title as a
67. See Dmama MswEs ET AL., 2 PRoPERTY LAW 3:36-3:43 (1990); J.E. Cote,
P'rescription of Title to Chattels, 7 ALTA. L. REv. 93 (1968-69).
68. Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.A. ch. L-15, § 51 (1980).
69. See generally Cote, supra note 67.
70. Id. at 93-94.
71. SimmoN-os & STEwART, supra note 47, at 93.
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defense. 72 Therefore, despite the operation of limitation periods, it is
not inconceivable for an aboriginal person to enter a museum and
peacefully remove what is his/hers, nor are such encounters unheard
of. In the late 1970s, a medicine bundle was removed from the
Provincial Museum of Alberta and returned to the Blood tribe. In the
spirit of maintaining good public relations, the museum did not press
charges. If the museum had pressed charges, undoubtedly the Blackfoot
would have defended with the right of recaption, and the apparent
loophole in the Alberta legislation would have been put to the test.3
In the United States, there is a policy against the application of
statutes of limitations to Indian claims in the absence of a clear federal
statement to the contrary.74 In Canada, the issue has yet to be resolved.
In cases of concealed information, continuing trespass limitation per-
iods will not run until the concealment is discovered or with reasonable
diligence it ought to have been discovered. 75 However, beyond these
two situations, the state of law in Canada is unclear as lower courts
have applied limitation periods to prevent property claims by aboriginal
peoples. 76 Perhaps the fiduciary obligation of the Crown to aboriginal
peoples, principles of constitutional law, and the law of extinguishment
render existing limitation periods inapplicable to native aboriginal
people."n
D. Laches
A different but related issue is whether the equitable doctrine of
laches can be applied to effectively bar aboriginal claims to property.
Laches assumes that the law aids the vigilant and not those who sleep
on their rights. Failure to assert a claim which results in prejudice to
another party may give rise to a defense of laches and operate as an
equitable bar to the plaintiff. The doctrine will not apply where the
72. Assume for example that A takes property from B. B sues A in conversion. A
defends with a right of recaption. See id. at 93-105; Devoe v. Long & Long, [19511 1
D.L.R. 203 (N.B. S.C.A.D.). It is possible that the Seizures Act, R.S.A., ch. 5-11
(1980) may affect the availability of this defense. See Re Canadian Acceptance Corp.,
2 Alta. L.R.2d 377 (Alta. Dist. Ct. 1977).
73. Interview with Ruth McConnell, Assistant Curator of Ethnology, Provincial
Museum of Alberta (Jan. 19, 1991).
74. See, e.g., Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 240-44 (1985).
75. Guerin v. The Queen, [19841 2 S.C.R. 335, 390 (Can.); Johnson v. British
Columbia Hydro & Power Auth., [1981] 3 C.N.L.R. 63 (B.C.S.C.).
76. See, e.g., Appassasin v. Canada, [1988] 1 C.N.L.R. 73, 144-46 (Fed. Ct.);
Ontario v. Bear Island Found., 15 D.L.R.4th 321, 444 (1985), affd [1989] 2 C.N.L.R.
73 (Ont. C.A.) (on appeal to Supreme Court of Canada); see also William B. Henderson,
Litigating Native Claims, LAw Soc'y GAZE=rn 174, 191-92 (1985).
77. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 225-71.
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defendant in an action has been guilty of equitable fraud, but it has
been algplied to the detriment of aboriginal peoples in the absence of
fraud.78 It is submitted that because laches is an equitable and discre-
tionary doctrine, it will not be applied without considering the circum-
stances of transfer and the ability of the natives to learn of and act
on their rights in law2 9
Gfiven the recent emphasis by the Supreme Court of Canada on the
Crown's history of honoring its obligations to aboriginal peoples "in
the 'breach" and the Crown's fiduciary duty toward Canada's First
Nations, it is submitted that the Supreme Court will be hesitant to
apply doctrines of equity in favor of the Crown.80 However, the issue
will not be as easily resolved where innocent parties, such as museums,
are affected.
8'
E. Effect of Invalidity of Transfer and Finding
Acquiring possession through a faulty chain of title may render the
possessor a bailee. The bailment may be characterized as unconscious
or involuntary because the possessor did not intentionally assume the
responsibilities of a bailee. However, intention may be imputed by the
Court. Classification as either unconscious or involuntary has the effect
of reducing the standard of care necessary to meet the bailee's obli-
gation to care for the goods bailed. It has been said that there is no
duty of care assumed by an unconscious bailee until the bailee knows
he is dealing with someone else's property. 82 However, recent English
authority suggests there is a duty on unconscious bailees to use a
sufficient standard of care to ascertain whether or not goods within
their control are their own. 3 Despite some uncertainty on this point,
it is c[ear that once a person is aware she or he is dealing with someone
else's property and assumes responsibility, that person is subject to
the rights and obligations of an involuntary bailee.8 An involuntary
78. See Henderson, supra note 76, at 192.
79. This reasoning has been rejected by the Ontario trial court and the Court of
Appeals in Ontario v. Bear Island Found., 15 D.L.R.4th 321 (Ont. H.C. 1984), aff'd
[1989] 2 C.N.L.R. 73 (Ont. C.A.) (on appeal to Supreme Court of Canada), but it is
yet to be addressed directly by the Supreme Court of Canada. This argument has been
accepted and applied to aboriginal peoples in the international area. See Cayuga Indian
Claims (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 6 R.I.A.A. 173, 189 (1926).
80. Regina v. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th 385, 404 (Can. 1990); see also Catherine Bell,
Reconciling Powers and Duties: A Comment on Horseman, Sioui and Sparrow, CoNsT.
FOR., Autumn 1990, at 1.
81. Interestingly, laches was raised as a defense by the Glenbow-Alberta Institute
in relation to the Mohawk repatriation claim, but the matter was never resolved at trial.
See Affidavit of Chiefs Billy Two-Rivers, John Bud Morris, Eugene Montour, and
Grand Chief Joseph Tehokheron Norton, Mohawk Bands v. Glenbow-Alberta Inst.,
[1988] 3 C.N.L.R. 70 (Alta. Q.B.) (No. 8801-00657).
82. See, e.g., Cosentino v. Dominion Express Co., 16 Man. L.R. 563 (Man. C.A.
1906).
83. AVX Ltd. v. EGM Solders Ltd., The Times (Eng. Com. Crt., 1982).
84. N.E. PAmm, BtmEaNr 379-91 (1979).
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bailee has a duty not to be grossly negligent with the bailed goods, a
standard less stringent than the ordinary standard of reasonable care.
If an aboriginal community successfully establishes title to cultural
property in the custody of a museum, the museum could be viewed
in law as an involuntary bailee. In a repatriation claim, the standard
of care offered by museums is not likely to be an issue unless the
goods are damaged or used in a way offensive to native religion.
However, classification as a bailee may affect the enforceability of
deaccession policy and policies concerning access to and return of
aboriginal property. For example, a bailee cannot place conditions on
the return of bailed goods to a bailor in absence of agreement or
legislation to the contrary. The current policy of some Canadian
museums is to return cultural property to originating communities if
certain conditions are met such as paying compensation for cost of
care, availability of proper caring facilities, and replacement of origin-
afs with replicas. Such conditions assume the museum has title. If a
bailee, these conditions can be imposed only by the courts or through
legislation. 5
An illustration of legislated interference is the resolution of the claim
by the Onondaga Tribe of the Iroquois Nation for the return of
wampum belts in the custody of the New York State Museum in
Albany. The Onondaga considered the belts to be an integral part of
their culture, as symbols woven into the belts constituted their only
recorded history. Demands for return were refused by the state museum
until 1971. Bending to public pressure, the legislature passed an act
requiring the return of the wampum belts.8 As a condition of return,
the Onondaga had to replace the belts with replicas and build an
appropriate fireproof facility on the reservation to house them. The
adequacy of housing would be determined by the museum. The fire-
proof housing requirement was impossible to meet because of the costs
to develop the facilities. Consequently, the Onondaga were unable to
regain custody of their belts.Y
A bailee also has limited rights of transfer. A bailee can transfer
possession to a sub-bailee but only with the consent of the bailor. If
consent is express or implied by the courts, the owner can enforce
bailment rights against the bailee and sub-bailee. A chain of liability
is created through the sub-bailment. If the original bailee transfers
possession without consent, the bailee is strictly liable to the bailor
85. If the right to control aboriginal cultural property is recognized as an aboriginal
right, limitations on the exercise of property rights imposed after 1982 will have to meet
the justification test in Regina v. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th 385, 412-17 (1990) (Can.). See
discussion infra text accompanying notes 239-41.
86. N.Y. Indian Act para. 27 (McKinney), cited in Blair, supra note 6.
87. Blair, supra note 6, at 126.
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for breach of bailment and may be liable in conversion. 8 Applying
this analysis to repatriation claims, if a museum holds property as
bailee, and as part of its deaccession policy decides to sell the bailed
property by public auction or private sale or to lend it to other
museums, these actions could amount to conversion. Both the museum
and the subsequent bailee of the museum could be liable to aboriginal
owners. 89
Liability may also be incurred if a museum intentionally discards or
destroys aboriginal cultural property in its possession. Intentional de-
struction could be an act of conversion and a breach of bailment.
Destruction or failure to return the property could give rise to strict
liability. Only in the case of loss or unintentional damage would the
museum be protected from liability and only if it can prove the cause
of the loss of damage was not negligent or unreasonable in nature. If
the damage or loss occurs while the bailed items are in the care of
the museum, the onus is on the museum to disprove negligence.
It is important to note that the museum may be insulated from
liability by the application of limitation of actions legislation. However,
until the issues of title are resolved, it is wise for museums to exercise
caution in the disposal of aboriginal cultural property. For such prop-
erty, destruction is not an option and sale should be a last resort.
Rather, to comply with a potential bailee's obligations, a museum
might make reasonable efforts to locate and negotiate the return of
property to originating communities or their ancestral groups. It should
be noted that there is some danger in this approach as the return of
artifacts to the wrong group could result in an action in conversion.
However, a court is unlikely to award significant damages against a
museum if the museum acted reasonably and the property can be
recovered. In order to ensure this outcome, United States legislation,
NAGIPRA, provides that in the event of disputing claims, the museum
can hold the property claimed until the dispute is resolved or a method
of disposition is agreed upon.9° Any museum that repatriates an item
in good faith pursuant to the legislation is not liable for claims by an
aggrieved party or for claims of breach of trust or violations of state
law inconsistent with the act.9'
If a museum is unable to ascertain the originating community, the
best solution may be to place the artifacts with another museum that
can provide proper care for the artifacts until the issue of ownership
is resolved. Further, clear records of disposition of the artifact and
88. See PALmER, supra note 84, at 786-87; see also Chapman v. Robinson &
Ferguson, [1970] 71 W.W.R. 515 (Atla. Dist. Ct.).
89. A.P. BELL, MODERN LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND
130 (1989).
90. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(e) (Supp. IV 1992).
91. Id. § 3005(0.
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proceeds from sales should be kept. Any decisions relating to disposal
should take into account the religious and cultural value of artifacts
in addition to their economic value. Finally, all decisions must take
into account the Cultural Property Export and Import Act92 which
restricts the import and export of cultural property.
F. Summation of Common Law Arguments
Although the cultural hurdles associated with repatriation claims will
likely be overcome by aboriginals making these claims, the limitation
periods may still operate to block these claims. If limitation periods
can be avoided, stolen property and property sold without the authority
of the collective are the most vulnerable to repatriation claims by
operation of the principle of nemo dat. Rights of landowners to skeletal
remains and objects buried in or lying on land may be subordinated
to claims of an ancestral aboriginal group showing sufficient historical
connection and cultural affiliation to the property at issue, unless the
property is abandoned. However, it will be difficult to prove prior
possession because title is presumed in the landowner or person in
possession, most aboriginal peoples did not keep written records, and
most creators or relevant witnesses are dead. Further, the passage of
time may make tracing the property at issue to a particular group
difficult. Although the court will accept the oral tradition of aboriginal
witnesses in testimony, scientific corroboration will be required. 9 The
result is lengthy and costly litigation.
IV. Federal and Provincial Heritage Resource Legislation
The Constitution Acts of 1867 and 1982 divide legislative jurisdiction
over the control of personal property and archaeological resources
between the federal and provincial governments. 94 The provinces pos-
sess jurisdiction over provincial Crown lands, property, and civil rights
within their provincial boundaries. Pursuant to these powers, most
provinces have enacted provincial parks and heritage conservation
legislation. The federal government has legislative jurisdiction over
federal property, Indians and lands reserved for Indians, shipping,
navigation, and the regulation of trade and commerce. Pursuant to
92. R.S.C. ch. C-51 (1985). For a general discussion on museum deaccession and
repatriation policies in Canada and the United States, see, for example, David W. Barr,
Legacies and Heresies: Some Alternatives in Disposing of Museum Collections, MUSE,
Summer 1990, at 14; Ames, supra note 8, at 47; Michael Tymchuk, Repatriation -
The Saskatchewan and Canadian Experience, LIAISON, Summer 1984, at 7.
93. See, e.g., Ontario v. Bear Island Found., 15 D.L.R.4th 321, 336-40 (Ont. H.C.
1984), aff'd [1989] 2 C.N.L.R. 73 (Ont. C.A.) (on appeal to Supreme Court of Canada);
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 79 D.L.R. 4th 185 (1991).
94. CA. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) pt. VI, §§ 91-92.
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these powers, the federal government has enacted legislation that di-
rectly and indirectly affects the ownership, control, and export and
import of archaeological and cultural property of national importance.
Prior to May of 1990, federal resource management policy was
scattered throughout the Indian Act, shipping legislation, parks and
historic sites legislation, museums legislation, and the Cultural Property
Import and Export Act. 95 In May of 1990, Communications Minister
Marcel Masse announced the federal government's intention to develop
a comprehensive policy and legislative framework for the ownership,
protection, and management of archaeological property found on fed-
eral lands including reserve lands and lands in the Yukon and North-
west Territories. 96 In February of 1991, draft legislation was tabled.
The bill is the product of a consultation process with various inter-
ested groups including members of the scientific, museum, and abo-
riginal communities and is currently being distributed to permit detailed
comment prior to its introduction to parliament. 97 The proposed Ar-
chaeological Heritage Protection Act is intended to operate in addition
to existing measures under parks and environmental legislation but
introduces some consequential amendments to the Cultural Import and
Export Act, Yukon Act, and the Northwest Territories Act. 98 Of
particular concern to aboriginal people are provisions placing owner-
ship and control of resources in the federal government and special
provisions controlling the excavation of burial sites.
A. Provincial Legislation
All provinces have addressed the need to protect archaeological
resources located on public provincial lands and private lands. Usually,
ownership, excavation, custody, and transfer of archaeological prop-
erty is addressed within a larger legislative framework designed to
'manage and conserve a broader category of historical resources." Most
95. See, e.g., Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., ch. S-9 (1985); Cultural Property
Import and Export Act, R.S.C., ch. c-51 (1985); Historic Sites and Monuments Act,
R.S.C., ch. H-4 (1985); Indian Act, R.S.C., ch. I-5 (1985); Museums Act, 38 Eli. II.
ch. 3 (1990); National Parks Act, R.S.C., ch. N-14 (1985); Northwest Territories Act,
R.S.C., ch. N-27 (1985); Yukon Act, R.S.C., ch. Y-2 (1985).
96. Hon. Marcel Masse, Archaeology: Protection of Our Heritage (Whitehorse,
Yukon, May 10, 1990) (doc. SP-90-8080E-12).
97. GLOBE & MAn. (Toronto), supra note 42.
98. Proposed Act Respecting the Protection of Archeological Heritage of Canada
(Communications Canada, Dec. 19, 1990) R.S.C., ch. C-51 (1985); [hereinafter Archae-
ological Heritage Protection Act]. R.S.C., ch. 4-2 (1985); R.S.C., ch. N-27 (1985).
99. Some provinces have special legislation protecting sacred lands, objects, and
burial sites. This is the exception, not the rule. See, e.g., Heritage Property Act, S.S.
ch. H-2.2, § 65 (1979-80); Heritage Conservation Act, R.S.B.C. ch. 165, § 6 (1979).
Also, the government of British Columbia is proposing amendments to its existing
heritage legislation to allow for greater aboriginal control and ownership over aboriginal
cultural property and to negotiate return. See also Draft Heritage Conservation Act,
supra note 42, § 28(5).
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legislation provides for designation of historical resources, reporting
of funds, government ownership of archaeological resources, control
of excavations on public and private lands through a permit system,
archaeological impact assessments, stop orders, and penalties for non-
compliance.
1. Historical Resources Act
In Alberta, ownership and management of historical resources is
regulated by the Historical Resources Act.1°° The common law respect-
ing ownership and acquisition of property within the scope of the Act
is substantially altered. The extent of the alteration depends upon the
classification of the property as an archaeological resource. The Act
defines "archaeological resource" as a work of man that is primarily
of value for its prehistoric, historic, cultural, or scientific significance,
and is or was buried or partially buried in land in Alberta or submerged
beneath the surface of any watercourse or permanent body of water
in Alberta, and includes the works of man or classes of works of man
designated by regulations as archaeological resources. 01
(a) Archaeological Resources
In 1978, the Historical Resources Act was amended to vest ownership
of archaeological resources found on public and private lands in the
Crown.102 The legislation also grants the Minister power to provide
for the care, management, excavation, and disposition of archaeolog-
ical resources. As a result of these provisions, the provincial Crown
becomes the first link in the chain of title to archaeological resources
excavated and acquired after 1978. Claims for resources after 1978
arising from prior ownership or possessory rights can be brought only
by the Provincial Crown. Security of title is dependent on derivation
from the Crown, compliance with conditions placed by the Crown,
100. R.S.A. ch. H-8 (1980).
101. R.S.A., ch. H-8 § 1 provides:
(e) "historic object" means any historic resource of a moveable nature
including any specimen, artifact, document or work of art;
(f) "historic resource" means any work of nature or man that is primarily
of value for its palaeontological, archaeological, prehistoric, historic, cul-
tural, natural, scientific or aesthetic interest including, but not limited to,
a palaeontological, archaeological, prehistoric, historic or natural structure
or object;
(g) "historic site" means any site which includes or is comprised of an
historical resource of an immoveable nature or which cannot be disasso-
ciated from its context without destroying some or all of its value as an
historical resource and includes a prehistoric, historic or natural site or
structure.
102. Alberta Historical Resources Amendment Act, S.A. ch.4, § 20.2 (1978). Own-
ership is vested pursuant to § 28 in the 1980 version.
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and compliance with the legislation. Ownership of archaeological prop-
erty acquired prior to 1978 continues to be determined by principles
of common law.' 03
The definition of archaeological resources is broad enough to include
aboriginal cultural artifacts that are or have been buried or partially
buried. In the context of repatriation claims, this means protection is
offered to museums and other custodians of aboriginal archaeological
resources which were acquired after 1978. If custodial or ownership
rights are derived from the Crown in accordance with the legislation,
the recipient receives legal title and is insulated from repatriation
claims. However, if archaeological resources are obtained from a
transferor other than the Crown or a person who has transferred rights
in violation of the legislation, the Crown has the legal means under
common law principles of nemo dat to challenge the validity of title.
Given the unique nature of the goods at issue, a successful challenge
by the Crown would likely result in a mandatory injunction for the
return of the property.
(b) Non-Archaeological Resources
Aboriginal cultural property that is not or has not been buried or
partially buried may fall within the definition of a historic object or
resource under the Act. Historic resource is defined to include works
of nature or man of "prehistoric, historic, cultural, natural, scientific
or aesthetic interest," 104 but the latter terms are left undefined, leaving
the application of the Act to a particular object at the discretion of
the Minister. 1°5 The common law rules respecting ownership and trans-
fer of these resources is not affected by the legislation in absence of
positive action on the part of the Minister.
Ti e Minister may acquire by "purchase, gift, bequest, devise, loan,
lease or otherwise any historic object, building or historic site" and
may sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of property so acquired
on any terms he or she considers appropriate.106 In doing so, the
Minister is bound by nemo dat; that is, the Crown cannot receive or
dispose of rights greater than those of the transferor. Consequently,
the Crown is not immune from ownership claims arising from invalidity
of the transferor's title or prior possessory rights. The Act also provides
that property received by gift, devise, bequest, or loan is subject to
any terms or conditions stipulated by the donor. Under common law
principles, violation of terms and conditions can result in revocation.' °7
103. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 25-93.
104. Historical Resources Act, R.S.A ch. H-8, § 1 (1980).
105. Id. § 1(f).
106. Id. § 5.
107. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 43-49.
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The rights of owners of historical resources can be limited if pres-
ervation of such property is considered, by the Minister or council of
a municipality, to be in the public interest resulting in its designation
as a registered historic resource, a provincial historic resource, or a
municipal historic resource. Designation may occur at the request of
the owner, other interested persons, or at the Minister's own initiative.
The main purpose of designation is to protect the property from
destruction, alteration, and removal without consent of the Minister
or municipal council. In the case of provincial historic resources, the
Minister must be notified of proposed dispositions and receipt of such
property by inheritance. The Minister may also make orders regarding
maintenance and repair. The designated property may include a historic
object together with any land in or on which it is located, and adjacent
land. Where the order relates to land, a copy of the order is registered
at the appropriate land title office as notice to potential purchasers. 08
(c) Protection of Historic Resources
Limitations are placed on the recovery, treatment, and disposition
of archaeological and other historic resources through various protec-
tive mechanisms in the Act. However, given the remote locations of
most archaeological sites, activity is often difficult to police. In ad-
dition to the designation provisions discussed above, several protective
measures are adopted including a permit system for excavations; ob-
ligations on finders to report discoveries of historic resources; penalties
for exporting archeological, historical or paleontological. resources out-
side of the province without written permission of the Minister; pen-
alties for contravening the Act; and the issuance of stop orders by the
Minister when an activity may endanger a historic site.1t 9
108. Historical Resources Act, R.S.A. ch. H-8, § 15(2)(c) (1980). Although it is
possible for moveable aboriginal cultural property to be designated under the provisions
of the Act, the author is unaware of any such designations.
109. Id. The Historical Resources Act provides: (1) Excavations on any land in
Alberta for the purpose of seeking or collecting historic resources, is prohibited without
a permit issued by the Minister. Id. § 26. With the exception of Saskatchewan, none
of the provinces require consultation with aboriginal peoples. (2) Persons who discover
historic resources in the course of making an excavation for a purpose other than for
the purpose of seeking historic resources are obliged to notify the Minister of the
discovery. Id. § 27. (3) It is an offence to transport archaeological resources, designated
historical resources and paleontological resources outside of the province without written
permission of the Minister. Id. § 29. The enforcement of provincial export prohibitions
is dependent upon the laws of the province within which illegally exported property is
situated. In absence of interprovincial agreements or federal legislation controlling
interprovincial trafficking of resources, the Crown's remedy may be limited to charging
the offender under the penalty provisions of the Act. (4) Permits are required for the
alteration, marking, damaging, and removal of archaeological resources. Id. § 30.
Designated property is also protected from damage and alteration. Id. §§ 15(5), 16(9),
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Although the legislation may operate to the detriment of aboriginal
peoples in the context of repatriation of archaeological resources, it
can also be invoked to protect their resources. For example, aboriginal
groups could use section 5110 to arrange for protection of and proper
care for communal cultural property which they are currently unable
to protect themselves. Many communities lack facilities for the proper
care and preservation of their cultural artifacts but wish to retain such
artifacts for ceremonial, educational, and other purposes. If the Min-
ister agrees to the Aboriginals Group's request, this property can be
loaned or donated to the Minister conditionally. For example, aborig-
inal groups may require that the property be stored in a suitable
facility close to the community, access be granted for ceremonial or
other purposes, and the property be cared for in accordance with the
custom of the aboriginal group and professional museum standards.
Conditions could also relate to care and compensation. Through this
process of cooperation, government institutions and museums can
provide a safe haven for important cultural property and ensure the
survival of native traditions.
Aboriginal groups can also utilize the stop order provisions of the
Act where development threatens an archaeological resource. As part
of their request for a stop order, aboriginal groups can seek suitable
arrangements for excavation or preservation of the resources. Although
consultation with aboriginal peoples is not required as part of the
permit, disposition, and assessment process, consultation is unlikely to
be denied upon request given the current political climate and the
potential for aboriginal rights claims.
The alternative course of action in the face of activity that threatens
historic sites, is to seek an injunction suspending development until
the issue of ownership based on claims to aboriginal rights can be
determined. Even though the Act places prima facie ownership of
22(6)). (5) If the Minister is of the opinion that an activity is likely to result in damage
to, or destruction of, an historic resource, the Minister may issue a stop order for a
period of fifteen days. The Lieutenant Governor may issue a further order suspending
activity to allow salvage, excavation, or an investigation of other alternatives including
designation and protection from development. Id. § 45. (6) Persons who contravene the
Act or regulations under the Act are guilty of an offence and subject to a fine of not
more than $50,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than one year or both.
Further, the Crown can restore properties altered or destroyed in violation of the Act
and seek compensation from the offender, or, if restoration is not possible, the Crown
can sue for damages. Id. § 48.
110. Id. § 5. Section 5 allows the Minister to acquire by purchase, gift, bequest,
devise, loan, or lease any historic object and lend or lease that object on any terms he
or she considers appropriate. Furthermore, any property acquired under this section by
the Minister by gift, bequest, devise, or loan is subject to any terms and conditions
stipulated by the persons giving, etc., the property.
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archaeological resources in the Crown, aboriginal groups will have
standing to bring an interim injunction application as long as they can
establish that there is a serious question to be tried. The success of
the application will depend upon the court's assessment of irreparable
harm, the balance of conveniences if damages are not an adequate
remedy for the aboriginal claimant or developer, and the impact of
suspending development on the economic health of the province."'
These considerations have been applied in favor of and against abo-
riginal people, leaving the question of injunctive relief to protect sacred
lands unanswered."
2
(d) Human Skeletal Remains
The Alberta definition of archaeological property refers to a "work
of man" and does not make specific reference to skeletal remains. As
a result, it is possible that skeletal remains excavated after 1978 are
not owned by the province. Ownership will be determined either by
principles of common law or aboriginal rights law. If the former
applies, aboriginal ownership will be measured against the rights of
landowners and assessed in the context of acquisition theory discussed
above, in particular the laws of abandonment. The matter has not
been the subject of litigation in Canada; therefore, the common law
in this area has not developed.1 3 The definitions of historical resources
and sites" 4 are broad enough to include skeletal remains and burial
sites. Consequently, the Crown may acquire rights to such property
through "purchase, gift, bequest, devise, loan, lease, or otherwise. '""
Further, limited protection from desecration is offered through the
permit, reporting, assessment, stop order, and designation provisions
of the Act.
Despite the above uncertainty, current archaeological practice in
Alberta is to obtain a section 26 permit for excavation. First, the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police are notified of the discovery of human
remains in accordance with the Fatality Inquiries Act." 6 If the remains
are suspected to be of historic or prehistoric significance, a section 26
permit is required. The custody and disposition of remains are dealt
with on a case-by-case basis. It is common for the police and the
111. Tlowitsis - Mumtagila v. McMi~lan Bloedel (Nov. 19, 1990) Vancouver No.
2499 (B.C.C.A.), at 4.
112. See, e.g., McMillan Bloedel v. Mullin, 61 B.C.L.R. 145 (1984); Ominayak v.
Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [19851 3 W.W.R. 193; Touchwood File Hills Qu'Appelle
Dist. Chiefs Council Inc. v. Davis, Lindsay & Sinclair, [1987] 1 C.N.L.R. 180 (Sask.
Q.B.).
113. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
114. See supra note 101.
115. Historical Resources Act, R.S.A. ch. H-8, § 5(1)(a) (1980).
116. R.S.A. ch. F-6 (1980).
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Minister of Culture to show a great deal of respect for the wishes of
local bands in the determination of these matters.1
7
It is possible to argue that Indian burial grounds are governed by
the provisions of the Cemeteries Act, which defines a cemetery as
"land set apart or used as a place for the burial of dead human bodies
or other human remains or in which dead bodies or other human
remains are buried.""'  The identification of the owner of a cemetery
is not addressed; however, rules relating to disinterment, removal, and
disposal of human remains are specified and limitations are placed on
disposition. In particular, disinterment cannot take place until an
application has been made to the Director of Vital Statistics who will
issue a permit at his or her discretion." 9 In practice, this legislation
has not been applied to aboriginal burial grounds which are no longer
used for burial purposes but are of sacred, scientific and historical
importance.
20
The failure to address specifically the issue of aboriginal skeletal
remains is common to most provincial heritage property and cemetery
legislation. The exceptions are Saskatchewan and Prince Edward Is-
land. The Saskatchewan Heritage Property Act provides that all skel-
etal material not found in a recognized cemetery or otherwise, is the
property of the Crown.' 2' However, excavated or naturally exposed
Amerindian'2 skeletal material postdating 1700 A.D. is to be made
available to the Indian Band Council nearest the discovery site for
disposition following appropriate scientific examination or educational
use.' !" The Saskatchewan court of Queen's bench has interpreted this
provision to recognize sufficient legal rights in the band councils nearest
the discovery to claim an interest in the skeletal material and support
an application for an interim injunction so that they can deal with the
remains.'1 In Prince Edward Island, special legislation has been en-
acted to protect ancient burial grounds. Burial grounds no longer used
for burial purposes that are not vested in a corporation or trustee are
117. Woodward, supra note 18, at 342.
118. Cemeteries Act, R.S.A. ch. C-2, § l(b) (1980).
119. Id. § 12.
120. To the extent that such legislation can be characterized as relating to "health,"
it may apply to aboriginal cemeteries currently in use located on and off reserve lands.
The Indian Health Regulations, which require Indians to comply with all laws and
regulations relating to health and sanitation, was enacted by the province. Letter from
Charles Webb, Director of Band Governance and Indian Estates Directorate, to Cath-
erine Bell (Dec. 5, 1990).
121. Heritage Property Act, S.S., ch. H-2.2, § 65(3) (1979-80).
122. The term "Amerindian" is not defined in the Heritage Property Act, S.S., ch.
H-2.2. It is likely used to refer to American Indians.
123. Heritage Property Act, S.S., ch. H-2.2, § 65 (1979-80).
124. Touchwood File Hills Qu'Appelle Dist. Chiefs Council Inc. v. Davis, Lindsey
& Sinclair, [1987] 1 C.N.L.R. 180, 185-86 (Sask. Q.B.).
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vested in the Crown. Legal action necessary to protect these lands
from trespass, defacement, and damage can be brought by the Minister.
The Minister is also empowered to grant permits to persons who wish
to visit such grounds. 125
2. Other Provincial Legislation
Claims for the recovery of cultural property may also be affected
by the Provincial Parks Act'26 and the Foreign Cultural Property
Immunity Act.127 Provincial parks legislation enables the provincial
government to designate provincial lands as parks or historic sites and
to purchase, expropriate, or otherwise acquire privately owned areas
of historical interest. Ownership of provincial parks is vested in the
province. 21 Artifacts recovered from the surface of these lands are
subject to the common law on the rights of fimders and prior posses-
sors, but power is given to the Minister to dispose of chattels found
in parks or historical sites if, upon reasonable inquiry, the owner
cannot be found. Objects under the land are presumed to be owned
by the province. They are subject to regulation by the Lieutenant
Governor in Council and may fall within the scope of the Historical
Resources Act.129
The Foreign Cultural Property Immunity Act' 3 applies to cultural
property which is ordinarily kept in a foreign country but is brought
into Alberta pursuant to an agreement between an owner or custodian
of the cultural property and the government of Alberta or any other
cultural, educational, or research institution for the purpose of tem-
porary exhibition, display, or research.' If the Lieutenant Governor
in Council orders that the property is "of significance" and publishes
the order in the Alberta Gazette prior to the property's entering
Alberta, proceedings in Alberta courts for the custody or control of
such property are barred. Further judgments, decrees, or orders that
have the effect of depriving the government or custodial institution of
care and control will not be enforced. 32 The Act does not preclude
actions on the agreement between the domestic and foreign parties or
actions against carriers under a contract of transportation. Cultural
property is defined to include products of archaeological excavations
125. Ancient Burial Grounds Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. A-9 (1974).
126. R.S.A. ch. P-22 (1980).
127. R.S.A. ch. F-12.5 (1985).
128. Examples of parks established because of significant aboriginal cultural interest
are Head Smashed in Buffalo Jump in Alberta, St. Victors Petroglyphs Historic Park
in southern Saskatchewan, and the Nanaimo Petroglyph Park in British Columbia.
129. R.S.A. ch. H-8 (1980).
130. R.S.A. ch. F-12.5 (1985).
131. Id. § 2(1).
132. Id.
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or discoveries, elements of artistic or historical monuments or archae-
ological sites that have been dismantled or dismembered, and objects
of wtistic or ethnological interest.'
Because the Act applies to "custodians" of property ordinarily kept
in a foreign country, the Act could be used to bar claims by aboriginal
peoples for cultural property exported to foreign countries which is
temporarily in the province for the purpose of display or research.
Even if the legal rights of the foreign custodian are dubious, custody
and control by the government of Alberta or Canadian institutions
could not be challenged in face of the Lieutenant Governor's order.
The application of this Act to repatriation claims was raised in the
pleadings filed in "The Spirit Sings" repatriation claim against the
Glentbow-Alberta Institute." 4 Some of the artifacts in question were
loaned by museums in Europe and the United States and were desig-
nate as significant cultural property in accordance with the Act. As
a result, the Glenbow-Alberta Institute pled that all proceedings re-
garding items designated as culturally significant were barred. 35 The
plaintiff's response was as follows:
The Foreign Cultural Property Immunity Act of Alberta,
... is ultra vires, unconstitutional, a denial of the rule of
law, equality before the law and equal protection of the
law, a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and
section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and in any
event inoperative.'
3 6
The court has yet to rule on the validity and application of this
legislation to aboriginal repatriation claims. It is beyond the scope of
this eaticle to scrutinize the strength of the above arguments. However,
the question of application of general legislation to aboriginal rights
is exmnined to a limited extent below.
B. Federal Legislation
1. Existing Legislative Framework
(a) Ownership
The federal government has not asserted a comprehensive legislated
claim to ownership of cultural property located on federal lands.
133. Id. § I.
134. Statement of Claim of the Mohawk Bands of Kahnawake, Akwesasne, and
Kanesatake et al. at para. 44, Mohawk Bands v. Glenbow-Alberta Inst., [19881 3
C.N.L.R. 70 (No. 8801-00657); Statement of Defence of the Glenbow-Alberta Inst. at
para. 9, Mohawk Bands (No. 8801-00657).
135, Statement of Defence of the Glenbow-Alberta Inst. at para. 9, Mohawk Bands
(No. 8801-00657).
136. Statement of Claim of the Mohawk Bands of Kahnawake, Akwesasne, and
Kanesatake et al. at para. 44, Mohawk Bands (No. 8801-00657).
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Consequently, the common law of property is the basis for determining
most questions of ownership, unless aboriginal rights law gives rise to
an alternative legal framework. Aboriginal rights to property buried
or partially buried in the land, other than reserve lands, will be
measured against the rights of the federal government as "landowner."
The policy of the federal government is to assert ownership to ar-
chaeological resources in federal Crown lands. 37 Rights to objects
lying on the surface of federal lands are measured against the rights
of finders and prior possessors.
Unless the Crown evidences an intent to control the land and all
objects upon it, its rights may be inferior to those of a finder. Public
access to Crown lands will be considered in assessing the intent to
control.'38 In absence of control, the Crown's claim will be inferior to
rights of previous possessors unless prior rights have been extinguished
through transfer, abandonment, or some other legally recognized
method. The uncertainty of Crown title to articles lying on the surface
of the ground is "particularly pressing in the territories because in
many Arctic regions, sites are exposed and artifacts lie on the surface
of the land."'3 9 The failure to exercise control over these resources
through legislated ownership or physical control over access to the
lands may result in finders acquiring superior title to the Crown. For
these reasons, Northern aboriginal peoples are insisting that ownership
and protection of heritage resources be addressed in modern land
claims agreements.
Ownership of aboriginal cultural property on reserve lands is gov-
erned by the Indian Act. 40 Although the Crown does not claim own-
ership of personal property located on reserve lands, restrictions have
been placed on the disposition of specified articles of cultural property.
Section 91 of the Act provides that written consent of the Minister is
required for the transfer of title to Indian grave houses, totem poles,
carved house posts, pictographs, and petroglyphs situated on reserves.
The section also prohibits their destruction or vandalism. Persons who
violate this section are guilty of an offense and are subject on summary
conviction to a fine not exceeding $500; an ineffective deterrent if
property of significant monetary value is involved. Persons claiming
title through the offender would be mere custodians of the property
and subject to repatriation claims by the Minister on behalf of the
Indian band occupying the reserve. Any other form of personal prop-
137. Federal Archaeological Heritage Protection and Management: A Discussion
Paper at 57-59 (Ottawa: Dept. of Communications, April 1988) [hereinafter Federal
Archeological Protection].
138. Parker v. British Airways Bd., [1982] 2 W.L.R. 503, 516 (Eng. C.A.).
139. Federal Archaeological Protection, supra note 137, at 58.
140. R.S.C. ch. 1-5 (1985).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992
492, AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 17
erty situated on a reserve may be disposed of in accordance with
principles of common law, provincial laws of general application, and
section 45 of the Indian Act which regulates devising of property by
will.
The Indian Act defines reserve lands as tracts of land, "the legal
title to which is vested in Her Majesty, that [have] been set apart by
Her Majesty for the use and benefit of a band. ' ' ' 4' Consequently, one
coud argue that artifacts in or under the ground belong to the Crown.
However, this presumption can be displaced at common law by proof
of prior possession. The obligation of the Crown to manage reserve
lands for the use and benefit of the Indian band most likely extends
to the management and disposition of archaeological resources. In
fact, one might argue that the Crown has a fiduciary obligation to
institute protective measures where the band council has failed to take
initiative under its general bylaw making powers.' 42
(b) Protection
Protection of historical resources extends to archaeological resources
and lands of historical significance. Some protective devices may affect
acquisition of title. For example, custodians of property obtained in
violation of permit requirements could not assert ownership rights
against the Federal Crown if the Crown could prove prior possession
as "landowner." Existing policy regarding the protection and custody
of cultural property includes the following:
(1) Section 91 of the Indian Act prevents damage or destruction of
specified cultural property. General protection of property is offered
by the trespass and development provisions of the Act and trespass
and Land use bylaws enacted by the band council."43 Pursuant to these
powers, some band councils require archaeologists to apply for permits
to ccnduct research on their reserves.'"
(2) Archaeological resources located in national parks are protected
by the Canadian Parks Service under the National Parks Act and its
accompanying regulations."45 Pursuant to this legislation, archaeologi-
cal sites and historic lands, including those on Indian lands, can be
expropriated, purchased, or otherwise acquired for the purposes of
141. Id. § 2(1).
142. The concept of fiduciary obligation originating in Guerin v. The Queen, 13
D.L.R.4th 321, 340-50, 376 (1985) (Can.), has recently been extended in Regina v.
Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th 385 (1990) (Can.). The extent of this obligation is uncertain,
See generally WOODWARD, supra note 18, at 110-14.
143. R.S.C. ch. 1-5, § 91 (1985).
144. See Federal Archeological Protection, supra note 137, at 55.
145. R.S.C. ch. N-14, § 6(3) (1985).
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establishing a park. 146 Canada Parks Services also conducts inventories
of archaeological resources in national parks and historic sites and
may issue collection permits to archaeologists working in national
parks. General protection is offered to cultural property through the
trespass provisions of the Act. 47
(3) Canada has the power to designate, and enter into agreements
to protect, archaeological sites recognized as nationally significant by
the Historic Sites and Monument Board of Canada.48 However, the
Minister of the Environment is not bound to accept Board recommen-
dations or act upon them. An inventory of archaeological resources
in historic sites is kept by the federal government on a departmental
or project basis but a systematic mechanism for issuing permits for
all excavation in historic sites has not been developed.
149
(4) The Territorial Lands Act prohibits land use operations within
30 meters of a known archaeological site without a permit. Further,
authorities must be notified if archaeological resources are discov-
ered.5 0 Archaeological sites regulations under the Yukon Act and the
Northwest Territories Act govern the issuance of permits to archae-
ologists.'' The regulations are administered by the territorial govern-
ments.
(5) The federal government operates several repositories for archae-
ological artifacts depending upon the location of the excavation and
the identification of the excavator. 52 Under the Museums Act,"' the
Canadian Museum of Civilization acts as the repository for collections
generated by its research activities and other archaeologists operating
in areas of federal jurisdiction. 5 4 The Act provides for curation and
conservation of the artifacts.
(6) The federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process has
been used to protect archaeological resources. However, the existing
guidelines do not require that threats to archaeological resources be
considered.'
(7) In 1976, Canada ratified the 1970 United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention on the
146. For example, property in Indian burial grounds, petroglyph sites, and archae-
ological sites *has been vested in the federal Crown in the designation of Kouchibougac
National Park in British Columbia, Kejimkujik National Park in Nova Scotia, and
Choix National Historic Park in Newfoundland.
147. National Parks Act, R.S.C. ch. N-14 § 30 (1985).
148. WOODWARD, supra note 18, at 344.
149. Federal Archeological Protection, supra note 137, at 51, 53, 55.
150. Id. at 48; WOODWARD, supra note 18, at 129.
151. Federal Archeological Protection, supra note 137, at 55.
152. Id. at 61-62.
153. Museums Act, 38 Eli I: ch. 3 (1990).
154. See Federal Archaeological Protection, supra note 137, at 61.
155. Id. at 50, 59.
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"Protection of the World's Cultural and Natural Heritage." Anthony
Island in the Queen Charlotte Islands is the home of an ancient Haida
village and has been declared a UNESCO world heritage site. 1 6
(8) In 1978, Canada assented to the 1970 UNESCO Convention on
the "Means of Prohibiting and Preventing Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property."'15 7 The Cultural Property
Export and Import Act is enacted in accordance with this convention.
Pursuant to the Act, Canada can restrict the export of cultural property
enumerated on the Canadian Cultural Property Export Control List.
The definition of cultural property is broad enough to include aborig-
inal archaeological and non-archaeological property of historic, artistic,
or scientific interest. However, such items must be worth a minimum
of $2,000. If an object is on the control list, an export permit is
required unless the object is less than fifty years old or the creator is
still alive. The Act does not control dispositions within Canada. Where
a permit is refused, an appeal can be made to the Canadian Cultural
Property Expert Review Board. If it is unlikely that a Canadian
institution or -public authority will purchase the object, a permit must
be issued. The Act also provides tax incentives for the donation of
nationally significant cultural property to designated Canadian insti-
tutions and provides grants and loans to these institutions for the
purchase of objects.' Exports that violate the Act will not be effective
to transfer legal title. However, the success of repatriation claims will
depend on treaties with, and legislation of, the countries which receive
the illegal imports. An excellent illustration of this point is Canada's
request that the United States impose restrictions on the importation
of specified types of endangered archaeological and ethnological arti-
facts. The Canadian request suggests that perpetrators of illegal col-
lecting are usually Canadian citizens, but because Canadian museums
refuse to purchase items illegally obtained, the United States is the
major market for Canadian artifacts. However, under United States
law, estdblishing activities detrimental to Canadian cultural property
is not enough to justify a treaty or unilateral action by the President.
Rather, a request must establish a situation of pillage threatening the
cultural heritage of mankind or an emergency necessitating immediate
action. Unfortunately the Canadian government listed only one con-
temporary example of pillage in support of its request. As pillage is
a prerequisite to an agreement, this may be the reason why the request
was denied. The purpose of the Canadian request was to provide
Canada with practicable legal means to recover stolen and illegally
156. Id.
157. WOODWARD, supra note 18, at 343.
158. See Aaron Milrad, The Cultural Export and Import Act, 19 J. ARTs MoMT. &
L. 15 (1989).
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exported property from the United States. The effect of the refusal is
that Canada will have to resort to American courts and domestic
American law for the recovery of stolen and illegally imported prop-
erty.15
9
2. Archaeological Heritage Protection Act
The proposed Archaeological Heritage Protection Act will apply to
all lands owned by the Canadian government (public lands) including
Indian lands and lands in the Yukon and Northwest Territories. The
resource management envisioned by the legislation is similar to pro-
vincial schemes in that ownership of archaeological property is vested
in the Crown and a permit scheme is developed to regulate excavation
and disposition. Consequential amendments are also made to the
Cultural Property Export and Import Act to further restrict the export
of archaeological items from Canada.160 Unlike most provincial legis-
lation, the Act contains specific provisions relating to aboriginal burial
sites.
(a) Ownership and Control of Archaeological Resources
Section 5 of the Act gives the Federal Crown ownership of artifacts
found on public lands that are described in a list of protected artifacts,
burials, wrecks, specimens, and sites. The definition of public lands
does not include Indian lands. Artifact is defined as an "object or
any part of an object, that was made or used by human beings and
that has been discarded, lost or abandoned for 50 years or more."161
The definition is not limited to articles buried or partially buried.
Whether an object has been discarded, lost, or abandoned for over
fifty years will be a question of fact and law.
Section 5 bars claims by prior possessors to artifacts discovered and
disposed of after the legislation is enacted. In the context of repatri-
ation, this means aboriginal groups cannot claim common law own-
ership rights to artifacts found in or upon public lands after the
enactment of the legislation unless they can establish that (a) the object
is not an artifact within the meaning of the Act, or (b) the artifact is
not contained on the list of protected objects and sites. The inherent
weakness of the latter argument is that it can be defeated by placing
an artifact on the protection list. If the elements of the definition are
met, then the Crown and all persons claiming title or custody through
the Crown, are insulated from repatriation claims unless the right to
159. See generally William Kaplan, Assistance Under the 1970 UNESCO Cultural
Property Convention: Canada's Request to the United States, 22 STANFORD J. INT'L L.
123 (1986).
160. Id. § 28.
161. Id. § 2(l).
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aboriginal cultural property is successfully asserted as an aboriginal
right.
A possible loophole in the definition of "artifact" is that it does
not appear to extend to objects intentionally placed, concealed, or
hidden for religious or other purposes. For example, the Zuni War
Gods discussed earlier are intentionally placed in sacred locations and
left to be eroded by nature. Clearly, the War Gods are not abandoned.
As the act of discarding implies the rejection of an object as "un-
wanted," the definition of "artifact" may not encompass objects like
the War Gods. This omission may have a significant effect in future
attempts by aboriginals to reclaim sacred or ceremonial objects.
Ownership provisions do not apply to reserve lands, but the legis-
lation implements mechanisms to ensure some protection of artifacts
and sites located on reserve lands. Issues relating to ownership continue
to be governed by the Indian Act. 6 As legal title to Indian reserves
lies in the Crown, the Crown may find it necessary to bring repatriation
claims for illegally excavated objects on behalf of the Indian band.
Permits for excavations will likely continue to be issued by the De-
partment of Indian Affairs or in accordance with band council bylaws.
Additional powers are likely to be granted to the Minister under the
new Act, including the power to require emergency impact assessments,
grant stop orders, and grant inspection orders to ensure compliance
with the Act. 63
Consultation with descendants is required when burial sites are
discovered on Indian lands, Northern lands, or other public lands.
The definition of burial site includes human remains, objects placed
with human remains at the time of death, and objects later found in
conjunction with the human remains.' 64 Section 8(2) provides that the
Minister must be notified upon the discovery of a burial site and the
buriad must be treated with dignity and respect. Further, burial sites
are not to be disturbed except in accordance with regulations and with
the agreement of the appropriate land manager and representative of
the deceased. "Representative of the deceased" is defined to include
a direct descendant, or where the location of a direct descendant is
not feasible, a representative of the cultural or religious group most
closely affiliated.' 6'
Although the legislation recognizes the interest of aboriginal groups
in ancestral burial sites, this recognition is likely to be viewed as
insufficient to acquire standing in claim for ownership of skeletal
remains where the claim is based on common law principles of own-
162. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
163. GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), supra note 42.
164. Archeological Heritage Protection Act, § 2(1).
165. Id. § 8(3).
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ership. Skeletal remains and funerary objects fall within the definition
of specimens and artifacts that are subject to federal ownership and
protection. 166 Consequently, repatriation claims for burial items illegally
obtained from public lands after the enactment of the AHPA may
have to be brought by the Minister.
Section 6 of the Act enables the Minister to enter into agreements
for transfer of ownership, conservation, management, or protection
of any archaeological artifact, wreck, specimen, or other matter per-
taining to archaeology. Pursuant to this section, the Minister can enter
agreements with aboriginal peoples for ownership and control of ar-
chaeological resources on conditions stipulated by the Minister. The
inclusion of this provision is important because ownership of heritage
resources is currently being addressed in land claims and self-govern-
ment negotiations. 67 Section 6 also permits the Minister to enter into
agreements with museums and other institutions engaged in researching
and exhibiting archaeological artifacts for long-term management or
ownership of collections. The legislation does not address the question
of repatriation, but this issue could easily be the subject of a section
6 agreement.
Finally, it should be noted that the Crown is granted ownership of
all wrecks named in the protection list, found on public lands or
waters, or that have been lost or abandoned for fifty years or more.
The definition of wreck is broad enough to include native craft.
68
(b) Protection
As in the case of provincial legislation, acquisition of archaeological
property in breach of the protective provisions of the Act precludes
the acquisition of title enforceable against the Crown. 69 However, the
ability of the Crown to recover such property will be limited if property
is exported outside of the country. The issue of policing is addressed
through the appointment of land managers for designated areas, the
maintenance of a register, the power of inspection, the obligations to
report findings, and penalty provisions for reported violations. How-
ever, the problems associated with policing of archaeological sites in
remote unsupervised areas remains. The key protective provisions are:
(1) Activities which have the potential of adversely affecting any
artifact, burial, wreck, specimen, or site cannot be undertaken until
an impact assessment is made and a permit issued. 70
166. Id. § 2(1).
167. See, e.g., supra notes 1-2.
168, Archeological Heritage Protection Act, §§ 2(1), S.
169. Unlike provincial legislation, the federal legislation specifies the legal effect of
invalid transfers rather than leaving the conclusion to be drawn by common law. Id. §
12.
170. Id. § 7.
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(2) Permits are required by persons proposing to explore for, or
investigate, property protected by the Act. Permits will specify con-
ditions for exploration, disposition, reporting and restoration. Before
issuing a permit, the Minister is required to consider the professional
quadlifications of the applicant, the scientific merit of the proposed
exploration, and the suitability of proposed repositories. Permits are
revocable for noncompliance.'
7'
(3) Persons who discover archaeological property are obligated to
report the discovery to the land manager of the area and the Minister. 72
(4) In the event of an emergency, the Minister can issue orders
providing for immediate protection of archaeological properties. 73 The
Minister may also issue stop orders where she or he deems it necessary
to protect archaeological property.174
(5) The Minister may appoint inspectors to ensure compliance with
the Act. Inspectors have the power to enter all federal lands, including
reserves, but must obtain an order from the Justice of the Peace to
enter a dwelling place without the consent of the occupant. Use of
force is allowed only if the inspector is accompanied by a police
officer.' 75
(6) Contravention of the Act is an offense punishable by summary
or indictment. Summary offenses result in a fine not exceeding $2,000
dollars or imprisonment not exceeding six months or both. If the
offense is indictable, the penalty is a fine not exceeding one million
dollars or a term of five years in prison or both. Where more than
one artifact is involved, the fine imposed on conviction may be com-
puted in respect of each artifact as if separate complaints had been
filed. Objects obtained as a result of an offense may be forfeited to
the Crown. 76 The Act also provides for the issuance of tickets for
minor offenses.'" Special provisions deal with offenses by employees,
and the Attorney General of Canada is granted authority to apply for
prohibitory injunctions to prevent anticipated violations of the Act.'78
(7) Section 14 of the Act addresses the jurisdictional problems faced
by provinces attempting to reclaim property transported to other prov-
inces. Transporting provincial resources in violation of provincial leg-
islation is a federal offense. Further, title cannot be acquired in illegally
transported goods. In the event of a section 14 violation, the province
can request that the federal government act on behalf of the province
17i1. Id. §§ 9-10.
172. Id. § 11.
1711. Id. § 13.
174. Id. § 19.
175. Id. §§ 16-17.
176. rd. § 20.
177. rd. § 21.
178. Id. §§ 18, 25.
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through the enforcement of the penalty provisions and initiation of
repatriation claims.
79
The Office of Archaeological Resource Management has been created
to administer the Act. The work of the office will include administra-
tion of the certification system, offering advice on standards and
procedures for impact assessments, responding to emergency situations,
and developing programs to assist repositories in gaining access to
archaeological collections. Current federal policy states that the office
will assist aboriginal peoples in developing the resources required to
manage their archaeological property.8 0
C. Land Claims Agreements
Control over aboriginal cultural property may be the subject of
modern land claims and self-government agreements. For example, the
Yukon Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement'81 provides for coop-
eration with Yukon First Nations in the management of heritage
resources. 12 Management schemes are to be developed by the parties
to the agreement in accordance with stated principles, including rea-
sonable access to artifacts by Yukon First Nations, protection of First
Nation resources in priority over other Yukon Heritage Resources,
preparation of an inventory of Yukon ethnographic resources, and
establishment of standards for protection, care, and custody. The
Agreement further provides for consultation in the formation of gov-
ernment policy and legislation. A Yukon Heritage Board composed of
representatives from First Nations and the Government is to be estab-
lished for the purpose of recommending heritage resource policy.
Provision is also made for designation of heritage parks, sites, land-
marks, and watercourses; the management of documentary resources;
and consultation with affected Yukon First Nations before naming of
geographical areas. First Nation approval is required for access to
burial sites and consultation is required to determine the proper treat-
ment of these sites. The government also agrees in principle to assist
in the repatriation of resources originating from the Yukon.
More detailed provisions are made in the Nunavut Settlement Agree-
ment-in-Principle. 83 Priority is given to developing protective mechan-
isms and a suitable repository for archaeological resources in the
Nunavut area. Provision is also made for Inuit participation and
training in resource management. Of particular interest is the acknowl-
179. Id. § 14.
180. See Masse, supra note 96, at 11-12.
181. Yukon Comprehensive Land Claim Umbrella Final Agreement (Ottawa: De-
partment of Indian Affairs and No. Dev., 1990).
182. Id.
183. Nunavut Agreement-in-Principle, supra note 1.
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edgement in the Agreement that the parties do not agree on the issue
of title to archaeological specimens. This matter is left to be determined
by the parties in the final negotiations of the agreement. Ethnographic
objects and archival materials are dealt with independently of archae-
ological materials. Obligations are imposed on the Canadian Museum
of Civilization and territorial ethnographic agencies to lend the maxi-
mum number of ethnographic objects to institutions in the Nunavut
area and to the Inuit Heritage Trust. Loan requests from the Inuit
Heritage Trust are not to be refused unless certain enumerated factors
can be established, such as that the Trust is unable to maintain the
object without risk of damage, it is unable to provide access commen-
surate with scientific or public interest, the federal agency is unable
to loan the object because of a term in its original acquisition, the
agency requires the object for its own active research or display, or
the condition of the object prohibits its movement. With the exception
of the loan provisions, the issue of repatriation is not addressed.
D. Summary of Legislated Regime
Provincial and federal heritage legislation will affect repatriation and
other ownership claims to objects found under or on public lands and
private. Objects found buried or partially buried in private lands or
provincial lands after the 1978 amendments to the Historical Resources
Act belong to the provincial Crown.'8 Persons acquiring title through
the Crown after 1978 may be immune to repatriation claims. However,
if possession has been acquired in violation of the Act, or if aboriginal
resources are threatened by violation of the Act, aboriginal groups
may seek the assistance of the Crown to act on their behalf. Where
such objects have been illegally exported from the province, the prov-
ince is left to the mercy of the laws of the recipient province. This
situalion may be changed by the enactment of the federal archaeology
bill.
Under the new federal bill, artifacts under or upon federal lands,
other than Indian lands, will belong to the Federal Crown if the
artifacts are enumerated on the list of protected property. However,
such artifacts must be or have been lost, discarded, or abandoned and
be over fifty years old. Artifacts that fall within this definition cannot
be the subject of repatriation claims by aboriginal groups if such
claims are based on common law principles of ownership. Where title
is acquired in violation of the legislation, or where resources are
threatened by violation of the act, aboriginal groups can seek the
assistance of the Federal Crown. Consultation and agreement with
direct descendants of the deceased regarding management of aboriginal
burial sites is required in decisions regarding protection and manage-
184. Historical Resources Act, R.S.A. ch. H-8 (1980).
500 [Vol. 17
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/3
No. 2] CLAIMS TO CULTURAL PROPERTY 501
ment of these sites. If a direct descendent cannot be identified, a
representative of the cultural or religious group of the deceased must
be consulted. Where objects are illegally exported from the country,
the issue of repatriation will be governed by the law of the situs of
the object or by international agreements.
The existing federal scheme does not make a comprehensive claim
of ownership to cultural resources, and protective measures are scat-
tered throughout various bits of legislation. Consequently, common
law principles currently govern the determination of ownership issues
relating to property on or under federal lands and non-archaeological
property located on provincial and private lands. The ownership of
skeletal remains on private and provincial lands is uncertain, but it
may be determined in Alberta by principles of common law, as skeletal
remains do not fall within the definition of archaeological resource in
the Historical Resources Act."8 5
It is interesting to compare Canadian protection of aboriginal ar-
chaeological property to the approach taken in the United States.
Where the former presumes ownership in the landowner or prior
possessor by application of common law principles, the latter presumes
ownership by aboriginal peoples arising from aboriginal property rights
and sovereign rights to control the disposition of communal cultural
property. Where the former legislates changes to the common law to
protect property of provincial or national interest, including aboriginal
property, the latter legislates respect for aboriginal cultural and relig-
ious rights. Finally, where the former assumes trust and cooperation
on the part of the Crown, the latter demands it through positive
legislated obligations.'"s
V. Impact of Aboriginal Rights Law
on Claims to Cultural Property
Consideration of the American approach introduces the third stage
of the repatriation analysis: the impact of aboriginal rights law on
185. R.S.A. ch. H-8, § 1(a) (1980).
186. The new Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990
(NAGPRA), Pub. L. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.S. §§
3001-3013 (Law. Co-op 1983 & Supp. 1992)) illustrates this point. It requires all federal
agencies to compile an inventory of aboriginal skeletal remains and funerary objects in
their collections and to make such inventories available upon request to aboriginal
groups. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C.S. § 3003(B)(1)(C). A summary must also be made of
other cultural objects that fall within the definition of cultural patrimony. Id. § 3004.
If a request is made for the return of these items by a group establishing sufficient
cultural affiliation, such items are to be expeditiously returned. Museums which repatriate
items in good faith are not liable for claims by aggrieved parties. Id. § 3005(f). In the
event of competing claims, the federal agency may continue to hold the objects until
the court resolves the matter. Id. § 3005(e).
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claims to cultural property. The extent of the impact will depend upon
the resolution of several issues yet to be considered by Canadian courts.
Recent trends in Canadian aboriginal rights law appear to support the
expansion of aboriginal rights to include collective or communal own-
ership of moveable cultural property. Further, the recognition and
affirmation of "the existing aboriginal and treaty rights" in the Con-
stitution Act, 1982, could act as a catalyst for a new approach to
defining aboriginal rights which draws upon two historical streams:
tribal law and common law. However, recent comments by the Su-
preme Court of Canada cast doubt on its willingness to recognize
political sovereign rights of aboriginal peoples and to subordinate
Canadian law to tribal law and custom. Although there is some
willingness to blend both traditions in the interpretation and definition
of ights, the reluctance of the Supreme Court to accept aboriginal
sovereignty may mean that questions concerning validity of transfer,
sufficient cultural affiliation, abandonment, and other ownership issues
will be determined through an extension of principles of common law
and equity rather than the application of tribal law or blending of
traditions.
An aboriginal rights analysis of the property debate requires consid-
eration of the following issues:
(1) Do aboriginal groups have an aboriginal right to ownership of
moveable cultural communal property?
(2) Is the right an "existing" right protected by section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982, or has the right been extinguished by heritage
conservation or limitation of actions legislation? What is the legal
status and effect of the proposed Archaeological Heritage Protection
Act?
(3) What laws should be applied in the resolution of ownership
issues: tribal customary laws, common law principles of property law,
or both?
A. Aboriginal Right to Moveable Cultural Property
The Supreme Court of Canada has yet to render a comprehensive
definition of aboriginal rights that embraces all of the uses of the
term. To date, aboriginal rights have been defined on a case-by-case
ba is, arising from aboriginal claims to land or land use rights such
as hunting, trapping, and fishing rights.' This has given rise to the
view that aboriginal rights are a bundle of property rights associated
with title claims of aboriginal groups to specific parcels of land.
According to this view, aboriginal rights do not exist independent of
187. For an interesting discussion on different classes of aboriginal rights, see
generally Michael Asch & Patrick Macklam, Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sover-
eignty: An Essay on R. v. Sparrow, 29 ALTA. L. REv. 498 (1991).
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aboriginal title. The law concerning proof of title is undeveloped and
has yet to receive authoritative treatment by the Canadian Supreme
Court. However, where an aboriginal group is claiming aboriginal title
to land currently in its possession, lower courts have required proof
that the claimant group is an organized society and it occupied the
territory at issue to the exclusion of other societies since time imme-
morial.'88 Time immemorial suggests that the group must have occupied
the lands continually until the date that the British asserted sovereignty
in the area at issue. The requirements of organization and occupation
are interpreted flexibly, given the character of the lands and the way
of life of the aboriginal group. Although it is beyond the scope of
this article to analyze the legitimacy of these prerequisites, it should
be noted that the criteria for exclusivity and possession since time
immemorial are subject to much criticism. 89 Where a native group
asserts that it has title to lands and was unlawfully dispossessed, the
criteria of proof should apply at the date of dispossession. 190
This traditional definition of aboriginal rights can be contrasted to
the emerging theory that aboriginal rights are rights defined by pre-
existing Indian social order. Property rights to land are just one subset
in the entire bundle of interrelated rights including cultural, religious,
and political rights. For many aboriginal groups, the most important
right of aboriginal nations is the right to govern their people, their
affairs, the land, and its use. 91 The land is a sacred and integral part
of life which cannot be dealt with in isolation. To date, there are very
few incidents in which Canadian courts recognized the interrelatedness
of rights or aboriginal rights other than title and land use rights. A
188. See, e.g., Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs & Northern
Dev., 107 D.L.R.3d 513 (Fed. Ct. 1979); Ontario v. Bear Island Found., [1989] 2
C.N.L.R. 73 (Ont. C.A.); Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 79 D.L.R. 4th 185 (1991);
see also 'WooDwARD, supra note 18, at 216-18. Only the criteria of organization and
occupation prior to the coming of European settlers have been applied by the Supreme
Court. See Regina v. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th 385 (Can. 1990); Calder v. British Colum-
bia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Can.).
189. See, e.g., WOODWARD, supra note 18, at 216-18; Slattery, supra note 20, at
756-62.
190. Slattery, supra note 20, at 756.
191. The sources are numerous. See generally David Ahenakew, Aboriginal Title
and Aboriginal Rights: The Impossible and Unnecessary Task of Identification and
Definition, in THE QUESr FOR JUSTICE 24 (Menno Boldt et al. eds., 1985); MICHAEL
ASCH, Hom AND NATIVE LAND; ABOIGiO . RxoHTs AND THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION
(1984); FRANK CASSIDY & ROBERT L. BISH, INDIAN GOVERNMENT: ITS MEANING IN
PRACTICE (1989); Douglas Sanders, Pre-Existing Rights: The Aboriginal Peoples of
Canada (Sections 25 and 35), in CANADIAN CHARtuER OF RIGms AND FREEDOMS: COM-
MENTARY 707 (Beaudoin & Ratishin eds., 1984); GOVEaNENTS IN CONFLICT (Long &
Boldt eds., 1988); EVELYN PETERS, ABORIGINAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CANADA: A BIB-
LIOORAPHY 1986.
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notable exception are decisions rendered recognizing native customary
laws of adoption.'9
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court suggest that Canada is
moving toward a broader definition of aboriginal rights. Arguments
to support a broader definition of aboriginal rights are drawn in part
from the recent shift in Canadian law from a contingent theory of
aboriginal rights to an inherent theory of rights. The contingent theory
presumes that aboriginal rights are contingent upon Crown grant or
recognition and that such rights exist at the pleasure of the Crown.
The latter aspect of the theory supports the notion that aboriginal
rights can be terminated by the unilateral actions of the Crown.193 The
inherent rights theory presumes that aboriginal rights are sui generis
preexisting legal rights that exist independent of creation or acts of
recognition. An aboriginal right is a right recognized by an aboriginal
group as an integral part of its culture. This theory is invoked, in
combination with the British practice of entering treaties and early
United States decisions explaining British colonial law, to support the
argument that aboriginal rights may be terminated with the consent
of aboriginal peoples.'19
While it is true that this shift in theory has taken place in the
evolution of cases on land and land use rights, it can logically be
extended to expand the content of aboriginal rights beyond land use
rights. The basis for this expansion can be extracted from the recog-
nition of aboriginal rights in section 35 of the Canadian Constitution
and the definitional framework for section 35 set out in Regina v.
Sparrow,95 discussed infra. Further, it should be noted that the dis-
tinction between land use and other rights is an inappropriate cate-
gorization of rights; contrary to aboriginal perceptions of their rights.
Section 35 provides the court with an opportunity to avoid such a
narrow interpretation if, as Sparrow suggests, it is to be interpreted
192. See, e.g., Re Katie's Adoption Petition, [1962] 38 W.W.R. 100; Re Beaulieu's
Petition, [19691 67 W.W.R. 669; Norman K. Zlotkin, Judicial Recognition of Aboriginal
Customary Law in Canada, [1984] 4 C.N.L.R. 1.
193. See, e.g., St. Catherine's Milling Co. v. The Queen, 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.
1888) (Eng.); see also Slattery, supra note 20, at 748; WOODWARD, supra note 18, at
201-02.
194. See generally Michael Jackson, The Articulation of Native Rights in Canadian
Law, 18 U.B.C. L. Rnv. 255 (1984); WOODWA.D, supra note 18, at 200-05; BRuca A.
CLAm:, INDuIN TmrE IN CANADA 73-93 (1987) (chapter 6); Address of the Gitskan and
Wet'suwet'en Hereditary Chiefs to Chief Justice McEachern of the Supreme Court of
British Columbia, [19881 1 C.N.L.R. 17. Note that this line of argument has recently
been rejected by the British Columbia Supreme Court in Delgamuukw v. British Co-
lumbia, 79 D.L.R. 4th 185, 478 (1991). The decision has been appealed to the British
Columbia Court of Appeal and is expected to be appealed to the Supreme Court of
Canada.
195. 70 D.L.R.4th 385, 404 (Can. 1990).
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as a unique constitutional provision which draws from the common
law of aboriginal rights and the traditions of aboriginal peoples.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the courts have already placed
limits on the theoretical shift. First, the shift to inherent rights has
not resulted in a statement from the Supreme Court that aboriginal
rights may only be extinguished by consent. 196 Second, obiter comments
in the Sparrow decision suggest that the inherent rights theory may
not be extended to recognize aboriginal rights to sovereignty. 197
Sparrow is one of two landmark decisions in the development of
the inherent rights theory; the other is Guerin v. The Queen. 98 Drawing
on the reasoning of Justices Hall and Judson in the 1973 decision of
Calder v. British Columbia,1" the Guerin decision clarifies that abo-
riginal title is a "pre-existing legal right not created by Royal Proc-
lamation.... or by any other executive order or legislative provision."
Further, noting the difficulty of applying concepts of general property
law to aboriginal title, Mr. Justice Dickson concludes that the nature
of the aboriginal interest in land is best characterized by "its general
inalienability [to persons other than the Crown] coupled with the fact
that the Crown is under [a fiduciary] obligation to deal with the land
on the Indian's behalf when the interest is surrendered."'"2 The concept
of fiduciary obligation has been extended to limit the Crown's powers
to regulate aboriginal rights after their entrenchment in the Canadian
Constitution.2°2 However, it is unclear how far the courts may extend
this concept as a means to measure the legality of government action
towards aboriginal peoples.
Sparrow is the first statement by the Supreme Court of Canada
interpreting section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which provides
that the "existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples
of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed. ' 203 The phrase "ex-
isting aboriginal rights" was included in the Canadian Constitution
without agreement on the scope and content of aboriginal rights.
Section 37 of the Canadian Constitution was introduced to address
the problem of definition through a series of conferences on consti-
196. Some limits have been placed on the power of extinguishment through the
concept of fiduciary duty and the entrenchment of "existing aboriginal and treaty
rights." See Woodward, supra note 18, at 206-07; Bell, supra note 80; William Pentney,
The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada in the Constitution Act, 1982 Part II,
Section 35: The Substantive Guarantee, 22 U.B.C. L. Rv. 107 (1988).
197. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 79 D.L.R. 4th 185 (1991). See generally
Asch & Macklam, supra note 187.
198. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (Can.).
199. [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Can.).
200. Guerin, [1984] 2 S.C.R. at 336.
201. Id. at 382.
202. Regina v. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th 385, 408-10 (Can. 1990).
203. Id. at 395.
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tutional matters that directly affect the aboriginal peoples of Canada.
However, the conferences were unsuccessful, leaving the reconciliation
of aboriginal interpretations of their rights with Canadian law and
politics for subsequent negotiation. Failure of the political process left
the responsibility of definition with the courts.
2°4
Sparrow indicates a judicial awareness of this responsibility by pro-
vidiag a framework for the definition process. The appellant, a member
of the Musqueam Indian Band, was charged under the Fisheries Act2°s
for fishing with a drift net longer than that permitted by his band's
fishing license.2 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether
Parliament's power to regulate fishing is limited by section 35(l) and,
more specifically, whether the net length restriction was inconsistent
with that provision. The Court held that the scope of section 35(l) is
limited to rights "in existence when the Constitution Act, 1982, came
into effect.'"' Rights are affirmed in their unregulatbd form, subject
only to prior extinguishment. In drawing limitations between regulation
and extinguishment by legislation, the Court considered whether the
Fisheries Act or its regulations demonstrate a clear and plain intention
to extinguish the aboriginal right to fish. The Court concluded that
permits issued under the Act were simply a matter of controlling the
fisheries and not a method of defining the underlying rights of the
Musqueam people.28 After prescribing the analytical process required
to resolve the issue, the Court sent the matter back to trial court.
Rather than develop a comprehensive definition of aboriginal rights,
the Court chose not to place limits on the types of rights that can be
categorized as aboriginal rights, suggesting that the content of aborig-
inal :rights will continue to be tested on an ad hoc basis. Of particular
interest is the Court's refusal to freeze aboriginal rights at a particular
point: in history. Prior to Sparrow, it had been argued by lawyers for
the Crown that aboriginal rights are limited to those traditional uses
exercised by aboriginal peoples at the date Crown. sovereignty was
asserted over aboriginal territories. 2 9 For example, one could argue
aboriginal title does not include rights of ownership over objects
204. See Douglas Sanders, Prior Claims: Aboriginal People in the Constitution of
Canada, in 1 CANADA AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA 225
(Stanley M. Beck & Ivan Bernier eds., 1983); BRYAN SCHWARZ, FIRST PRINCIPLES:
CONsTTUTIONAL REFORuM WITH RrSPECT TO ABOROIIAL PEOPLES OF CANADA, 1982-84
(1985).
205. R.S.C. ch. F-14 (1985).
206. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th at 389.
207. Id. at 395.
208. The issue of extinguishment is discussed infra text accompanying notes 220-42.
209. See, e.g., Ontario v. Bear Island Found., 15 D.L.R.4th 321, 341 (1985), aff'd
[1989] 2 C.N.L.R. 73 (Ont. C.A.) (on appeal to Supreme Court of Canada); Slattery,
supra note 20, at 746.
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excavated and removed from aboriginal lands because, at the time the
Crown asserted sovereignty, the group was not in the practice of
excavating and controlling its archaeological heritage. Sparrow appears
to reject this approach in favor of a flexible interpretation of aboriginal
rights that allows for their exercise in a contemporary manner. Adopt-
ing Dr. Slattery's interpretation of "existing," the Court concludes
that "existing rights" are "affirmed in a contemporary form rather
than in their primeval simplicity and vigour. ' 210 Adopting this per-
spective, one can argue it is artificial to distinguish between the right
to use and control and the particular forms of use exercised at the
time of the assertion of British sovereignty. 21' Applied to the right to
fish, the Court implies that the practice of bartering may be revived
as a modern right to fish for commercial purposes. However, as the
case was not presented on the basis of an aboriginal right to fish for
commercial purposes, the Court confined its reasons to the aboriginal
rights to fish for food and social and ceremonial purposes.
212
According to Sparrow, a central consideration in characterizing a
right as an aboriginal right is whether the right was and continues to
be an integral part of the culture of the claimant group.23 Although
"integral" is not defined, it is important that the significance of the
right is measured in the context of society as a whole. That is, the
court considers the relationship of the right to cultural and physical
survival of the claimant group. The right to fish is an aboriginal right
not only because the salmon fishery is valuable as a food source, but
also because of its role in the system of beliefs, social practices, and
ceremonies of the Musqueam people.
214
Whether or not "integral" means essential to, or something between
significant and necessary, depends upon how strictly the courts wish
to apply the test and their willingness to expand aboriginal rights
claims. Further, obiter references in Sparrow to "evidence of sufficient
continuity of the right" could give rise to a new category of frozen
rights arguments. That is, one might read a continuing use requirement
from the date of British assertion of sovereignty, to the date of the
claim, as part of the integral test. If successful, this interpretation
would cause problems for aboriginal litigants, as repatriation claims
often arise from a desire to protect traditions suspended and threatened
210. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th at 397.
211. Despite this ruling in Sparrow, lower decisions have been reluctant to reject
the frozen rights approach. See, e.g., Delgamuukw v. A.C.B.C. (Mar. 8, 1991) Smithers
No. 0843, where Justice McEachern characterizes aboriginal rights as "sustenance rights"
at the date sovereignty is asserted but recognizes that the use of modem implements to
exercise the right does not change its nature.
212. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th at 402-03.
213. Id. at 398.
214. Id. at 398, 402.
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with risk of loss or to revive traditions which have not been exercised
continuously in an attempt to rebuild the cultural heritage of the tribe.
However, it is unlikely the test will be construed in this manner. First,
it is contrary to the spirit of the decision which emphasizes a generous,
liberal, and contemporary interpretation of "existing aboriginal rights."
Second, the argument that "sufficient continuity" means unextin-
guished, rather than continually exercised, is consistent with the inter-
pretive reasoning of the courts. Finally, given the historic role of the
Canadian government in attempts to exterminate aboriginal culture,
the equitable doctrine of estoppel may be applied against the Crown
and anyone claiming rights to cultural property through the Crown.
In assessing the integral nature, scope, and content of the right, the
Court considers anthropological evidence, but also emphasizes that the
interpretation of the right must be "sensitive to the aboriginal per-
spective itself on the meaning of the right at stake." 2z 5 Scope and
content of existing rights is not to be determined by executive or
legislative policy or action.216 This approach, coupled with the Supreme
Court's recognition that aboriginal rights are independent and "pre-
existing" legal rights, suggests that aboriginal rights are to be defined
by the traditions of aboriginal claimants as perceived by the claimant
group and supported by scientific evidence. 217 In this way, the court
adopts an inherent theory of rights and leaves open the possibility of
rights, other than land use rights, being recognized in Canadian law.
The narrowest interpretation of the developments in Sparrow is that
inherent rights of aboriginal peoples are limited to land and land use
rights. The effect of the combined application of the doctrine of
aboriginal title and the inherent rights theory is to allow the courts to
extend the concept of aboriginal rights to include property rights not
yet recognized in the bundle. The definition of aboriginal land rights
will not be limited to traditional concepts of property law. At the
same time, traditional common law rights are not automatically ex-
cluded from the bundle. This approach would subordinate the aborig-
inal perspective of the right at stake to a narrow analysis of the
common law.
The broader and better interpretation of these developments places
them in their historical and cultural context. It recognizes a general
215. Id. at 411.
216. Id. at 403.
217. Although Canadian courts have accepted the validity of oral evidence given by
aboriginal persons regarding their traditions and laws, the courts have yet to recognize
oral evidence as the "best evidence" in absence of scientific corroboration. See, e.g.,
Ontario v. Bear Island Found., 15 D.L.R.4th 321, 336-40 (Ont. H.C. 1984); Delgamuukw
v. British Columbia, 79 D.L.R. 4th 185, 252-82 (1991). Oral evidence of the native
understanding of their treaty rights is also admissible in the interpretation of treaties.
See Nowvegijick v. The Queen, [19831 2 C.N.L.R. 89 (Can.).
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shift from denial to recognition of preexisting rights defined by the
traditions of aboriginal peoples. This approach takes to heart the
categorization of aboriginal rights as sui generis rights that exist in-
dependently of the common law and "inhere in the very meaning of
aboriginality. ' ' 218 Rather than focus on the fact patterns and particular
land rights at issue in Guerin and Sparrow, emphasis should be placed
on the change in legal analysis and the spirit of these decisions to
draw general definitional guidelines. Rather than extract narrow, dis-
tinguishable rules, a pattern is discerned that allows the court to draw
on common law and aboriginal custom in the definition of rights and
extend legal recognition of aboriginal rights beyond the concept of
aboriginal title. Adopting this interpretation allows strong arguments
to be made for recognition of aboriginal rights to collective or com-
munal property where such property is linked to the cultural survival
of the claimant group. As the scope and content of existing rights are
not properly determined by government action alone, the court should
look to the history and traditions of the claimant group to determine
whether the integral test raised in Sparrow has been met; that is,
whether title to an object is essential to the cultural integrity of the
group. If the object performed and continues to perform an essential
function in the cultural life of the claimant group, Sparrow opens the
door to recognition of aboriginal ownership, subject to the law on
extinguishment. Types of objects that are likely to fall within this
category are religious objects, ceremonial objects, medicine objects,
and objects of particular historical significance.
An alternative approach to definition arises from the acceptance of
aboriginal sovereignty. 2 9 Here it is sufficient to note that the sovereign
rights approach would subordinate common law to tribal law and
resolve disputes in accordance with the traditions of the claimant
aboriginal group. Further, a logical corollary of this approach is to
reject the need for scientific evidence to support ownership claims if
sufficient evidence is rendered in accordance with aboriginal customary
law.
B. The Effect of Heritage Conservation
Legislation on Aboriginal Rights
Canadian law maintains that aboriginal rights exist at the pleasure
of the Crown. According to this doctrine, only those rights which are
unextinguished can be legally enforced by aboriginal groups. Rights
can be extinguished by unilateral actions of the Crown or by consent. 220
218. Asch & Macklam, supra note 187, at 493.
219. For a discussion of aboriginal sovereignty, see infra text accompanying notes
220-71.
220. See Slattery, supra note 20, at 731; WoonwARi, supra note 18, at 206.
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The predominant colonial practice in Canada was to enter into treaties
with aboriginal peoples. Through this process, some rights were ac-
quired, thereby replacing surrendered aboriginal rights with treaty
rights. Others were recognized by the Crown and given legal protection
through treaty. Those rights not addressed in the treaties were retained
by thd Aboriginal Group.? The Royal Proclamation of 1763 2 for-
malized the treaty making process and provided that only the Crown
could purchase aboriginal lands.m When the Dominion of Canada
was formed in 1867, the Dominion government assumed this role. The
administration of aboriginal rights policy was centralized under section
91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, by placing exclusive jurisdiction
over Indians and lands reserved for Indians in the federal Crown.
The practice of treaty making continued throughout most of Canada
and remains the predominant practice for the resolution of land claims
north of the sixtieth parallel through the contemporary mechanism of
land claims agreements. Although native peoples view these agreements
as recognition of their rights and that the government policy has
abandoned the language of extinguishment, the government continues
to view comprehensive land claims as a surrender of all rights in
exchange for those articulated in the agreement.
Whether the treaties had, and contemporary agreements should have,
the effect of extinguishing aboriginal rights including sovereign rights,
or whether the proper interpretation of treaties is the retention and
affirmation of aboriginal rights is currently a topic of legal and political
debate. A separate body of law has developed concerning the inter-
pretafion and enforceability of treaty rights, an examination of which
is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is relevant that prior
to May of 1990, Canadian law maintained that treaty rights could be
221. In Simon v. The Queen, 24 D.L.R.4th 390 (1986) (Can.), Justice Dickson states
that the treaty of peace and friendship at issue gave legal protection to existing rights.
Id. at 402. Professor Noel Lyon argues that this view of treaties may not apply in all
respects to treaties of surrender, but it should prevail where it is capable of applying.
Id. The argument of retained rights is derived from terms of the various treaties and
the American decision Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). To date,
Canadian courts have interpreted the prairie land cession as agreements to surrender
aboriginal rights in exchange for treaty rights. For a general discussion of treaty practice
in North America, see RENE FUMox.Au, As LoNo As Tins LAND Sn. LAST: A HISTORY
OF TRFATY 8 AND TREATY 11 - 1870-1939 (1973); ALEXANDER MORIS, TAE TREATIES
OF CANADA WITH TEE INDIANs (reprint 1971) (1880); Douglas E. Sanders, The Extent
of Reccgnition of Pre-Existing Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Legal History of
Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1988) (unpublished). For a discus-
sion of the principle of consent, see WOODWARD, supra note 18, at 198-99, 203-05;
Jackson, supra note 194.
222. Royal Proclamation of 1763, reprinted in R.S.C., No. I app. I, at 5-6 (1985).
223. Id.; see also WOODWARD, supra note 18, at 198-99; Jackson, supra note 221.
224. Constitution Act, 1867, reprinted in R.S.C., app. I, § 91(24) (1985).
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unilaterally extinguished by the Crown. Further, treaties were not
recognized as agreements between sovereigns.? However, in May of
1990, the Supreme Court of Canada characterized the Indian-Crown
relationship at the time of colonial expansion as falling somewhere
between "the kind of relations conducted with sovereign states and
relations such states had with their own citizens." Further, it con-
cluded that the consent of the Huron was required to extinguish their
treaty rights. The requirement of consent evolved from emphasis on
the concepts of fiduciary obligation and the need to uphold the honor
of the Crown in the interpretation of treaty rights. 7 This may be
evidence of a shift in treaty law away from upholding the doctrine of
unilateral extinguishment? 82
Although duty and honor have also been emphasized in the context
of aboriginal rights, a parallel movement upholding the need for
consent has not occurred. However, it is clear that consultation with
affected aboriginal peoples will be a significant consideration in as-
sessing the validity of legislation regulating aboriginal rights after their
affirmation in the Constitution Act, 1982.2" The rules with respect to
unilateral extinguishment prior to 1982 can be summarized as follows:
(1) Once an aboriginal right has been established, the onus shifts to
the Crown to prove that it has been extinguished?230
(2) Aboriginal rights may be extinguished by the exercise of legislative
jurisdiction, but the intent to do so must be clear and plain.?'
225. See generally PETER A. CummNO & NEIL H. MicxEaiNEE, NATrVE RIGHTs n
CANADA 54 (2d ed., 5th prtg. 1972); Douglas E. Sanders, Aboriginal Peoples and the
Constitution, 19 ALTA L. R. 410, 416-17 (1981); Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
387, 400 (Can.); Bert Horseman v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901, 936 (Can.).
226. Quebec v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, 1038 (Can.).
227. Id. at 1063.
228. See generally Bell, supra note 80.
229. See Regina v. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th 385, 417 (1990) (Can.).
230. Slattery, supra note 20, at 731.
231. See Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th at 401; see also WOODWARD, supra note 18, at 206-
07; Slattery, supra note 20, at 765-66. Prior to Sparrow, it was uncertain whether the
intent to extinguish must be clear and plain or if it was sufficient that the legislation
was inconsistent with the existence of an aboriginal right. In Calder v. British Columbia,
[19731 S.C.R. 313 (Can.), Justice Hall took the former position (and at one point states
legislation must be specific) and Justice Judson the latter. Despite the acceptance of the
clear and plain test in Sparrow, lower courts have paid lip service to the clear and plain
test, but in substance have applied the inconsistent test. See Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia, 79 D.L.R. 4th 185, 459-60 (1991), where Justice McEachern concludes "clear
and plain" does not require express statutory language. Considering the same colonial
legislation as that in issue in Calder, Justice McEachern purports to apply the Justice
Hall test but achieves the Justice Judson result. The issue of whether "clear and plain"
means express language or also includes necessary implication will likely be addressed
on appeal.
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(3) Aboriginal rights may be extinguished where the Crown exercises
com:plete dominion over the land in a manner that is adverse to
aboriginal rights of occupancy.232
In the recent Quebec v. Sioui233 decision, the court placed limitations
on the occupancy theory.23 At issue was the extinguishment of a treaty
right to practice religious customs in violation of Quebec Parks leg-
islation. 235 Justice Lamer held that the land at issue fell into the
category of lands occupied by the Crown, since the province had set
the land aside for specific use as a park.236 He emphasized that it is
the physical occupation of the space, and not the legislation, that gives
rise to the issue of extinguishment and concludes occupation alone is
not enough to extinguish aboriginal rights. 237 For rights to be extin-
guished, they must be contrary to the purpose of the occupancy and
prevent the realization of that purpose.218 Although the rights at issue
are treaty rights, the analysis could be extended to the broader category
of aboriginal rights.
Where legislation or acts of occupation limit but do not extinguish
aboriginal rights, the rights continue to exist as regulated rights. Ac-
cording to Sparrow, extinguished rights are not entrenched in section
35(1) of the Canadian Constitution, but regulated rights are entrenched
in their original form.239 Thus, government action prior to 1982 will
partially define the content of the aboriginal rights included in section
35(1) if the government has clearly operated to extinguish a purported
aboriginal right. After 1982, aboriginal rights cannot be unilaterally
extinguished without constitutional amendment. 0 Further, such rights
can be regulated only if regulation can be justified. If an aboriginal
claimant proves the existence of a right and legislation has the effect
of interfering with that right, the onus shifts to the Crown to justify
interference.
The test for justification involves two steps. First, the Crown must
establish a valid legislative objective such as conservation and man-
agement of natural resources. Second, the Crown must show that the
232. Prior to 1990, it was not clear whether this requires a physical occupation by
the Crown or if comprehensive enactment of adverse legislation is sufficient. Further,
it should be noted that this theory is subject to great criticism. For a review of methods
and criticisms, see Slattery, supra note 20, at 764-65; Woodward, supra note 18, at 203-
10.
233. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 (Can.).
234. Id. at 1073.
235. Quebec Parks Act, R.S.Q. ch. P-9.
236. Sioui, I S.C.R. at 1073.
237. Id. at 1072.
238. Id. at 1073.
239. Regina v. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th 385, 395-96 (Can. 1990).
240. There is some doubt on the continued validity of unilateral extinguishment by
methods other than legislated interference. See generally Pentney, supra note 196.
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objective is obtained in a manner consistent with upholding the honor
of the Crown. In this branch of the test, the court emphasizes the
concept of fiduciary duty. Questions to be asked in the justification
process include whether there is as little interference as possible with
aboriginal rights, whether fair compensation is paid in the event of
expropriation and whether the aboriginal group affected has been
consulted. 241
The application of these principles to existing federal and provincial
legislation suggests the heritage conservation legislation and limitation
of actions legislation do not extinguish aboriginal rights, but inconsis-
tent occupation may. As existing federal legislation does not explicitly
place ownership of aboriginal cultural property located on Crown lands
in the federal government, it is difficult to argue that there has been
a statutory expropriation of the right. A clear intention to terminate
aboriginal rights is not evidenced, nor is termination necessarily im-
plied. Coupled with the rule of interpretation that ambiguous phra-
seology is to be interpreted in favor of the Indians, these arguments
suggest aboriginal rights of ownership continue to exist. The exercise
of the right may have been regulated, but the right is entrenched in
the Canadian Constitution in its unregulated form. Therefore, claims
to ownership cannot be met by the defense of extinguishment. Rather,
the Crown will have to justify continued regulation once the aboriginal
right to ownership is established.
Where federal legislation makes specific reference to aboriginal prop-
erty, the clear and plain test must be applied to determine if the right
is extinguished. For example, section 91 of the Indian Act restricts the
disposition of certain types of aboriginal property, but does the section
extinguish the aboriginal right to ownership of that property? Argua-
bly, in absence of a clear intention to vest ownership in the Crown,
aboriginal rights to section 91 property are simply regulated.
The conclusion that aboriginal rights to cultural property located on
or under federal lands are not extinguished raises the issue of the
validity of the proposed federal Archaeological Heritage Protection
Act. As the bill will be enacted after the Constitution Act, 1982,
secured aboriginal rights, it will not have the effect of extinguishing
aboriginal rights and it will regulate only the exercise of aboriginal
rights to cultural property if the justification test is met. Arguably the
test has been met for the protective provisions of the legislation, but
perhaps not the ownership provisions. Protection of archaeological
resources and the conservation of those resources is a valid federal
objective. Given extensive consultation with aboriginal groups in the
drafting of the Act and the current policy of helping aboriginal groups
develop suitable repositories for aboriginal artifacts, it is difficult to
241. See Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th at 411.
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argue the achievement of the federal objective is inconsistent with
upholding the honor of the Crown. In fact, one might even argue that
the federal government has a fiduciary obligation to develop or assist
in the development of such a scheme. 2 On the other hand, provisions
vesting ownership of artifacts in the Crown may not withstand abo-
riginal opposition because this provision offends the policy of minimal
interference. Further, the Act does not include a provision for com-
pensation of expropriated ownership rights.
A similar extinguishment analysis can be applied to the Historical
Resources Act.32 Sound arguments can be made to challenge the
constitutional competency of the provincial government to extinguish
or regulate aboriginal rights. For example, one could argue that section
88 of the Indian Act, which reverentially incorporates provincial law
as federal law upon certain conditions being met, is a breach of the
federal government's fiduciary duty and an improper subdelegation of
federal jurisdiction. The effect of section 88 is the abandonment of
federal responsibility for Indians to the provinces and the subjection
of Indians to whatever laws the provinces choose to enact. Despite
these and other arguments, the courts have held in many cases that
provincial legislation can limit the exercise of aboriginal rights. 2
4
Assuming this position is maintained, the Historical Resources Act
may affect the continuance of aboriginal rights. As discussed, the
Crown purports to claim title only to objects in or under provincial
or private lands unless positive action is taken by the Crown.24s No
such action was taken prior to 1982; therefore, the only property rights
that might be limited are rights to archaeological property. In absence
of clear reference to aboriginal ownership of archaeological resources,
one can argue that the clear and plain test renders this legislation
merely regulatory of aboriginal rights. Therefore, the right continues
to exist, and regulation must be justified if challenged.
Federal and provincial control of heritage resources may have extin-
guished aboriginal ownership rights if control arose from physical
occupation of an area prior to 1982 and if aboriginal ownership of
moveable property is completely inconsistent with the reason for oc-
cupation. For example, if land is set aside as a park because of its
archaeological significance or for the purpose of protecting and con-
trolling access to the site, full recognition of aboriginal ownership
rights might be incompatible with the purpose of the park. However,
242. See supra note 117.
243. R.S.A. ch. H-8 (1980).
244. See Leroy Little Bear, Section 88 of the Indian Act and the Application of
Provincial Laws to Indians, in GovERNMENTs IN CONFLCT, supra note 191, at 175. But
see Horseman v. The Queen, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901, 936-38 (Can.).
245. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 138-42.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/3
No. 2] CLAIMS TO CULTURAL PROPERTY 515
the rights limited may include only those rights that "seriously com-
promise the Crown's objectives,"2 such as the right to disposition.
This compatibility analysis will have to be applied to all federal and
provincial occupation of parks and other protected areas that are
subject to aboriginal rights of a native group.
The clear and plain analysis can also be applied to limitation of
actions legislation. 247 In the case of provincial limitations, the consti-
tutional jurisdiction of the Crown to extinguish aboriginal rights through
limitation of actions legislation will have to be addressed. As limitation
of actions legislation fails to address directly aboriginal property rights
as distinct from property rights in general, the legislation is unlikely
to pass the clear and plain test. Further, one might argue that its
application to aboriginal groups contravenes section 15 of the Charter
of Rights and Freedomsm because the effects of the legislation are
more severe on aboriginal rights claims than other property claims. 49
The severity arises from the fact that aboriginal rights claims are
historical claims and aboriginal rights is an emerging concept. Con-
sequently, knowledge of enforceable rights cannot be assumed. These
arguments, combined with the current confusion in Canadian law
concerning the application of the legislation' to aboriginal peoples,
suggest that limitation of actions legislation should not be effective to
bar aboriginal rights claims. 250
Heritage conservation -may also be inoperative to the extent that it
affects aboriginal rights to cultural property because its application
may be contrary to equality and religious freedom guarantees in the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 1 For example, aboriginal people
246. See, e.g., Quebec v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, 1073.
247. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 67-77.
248. Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982 ch. 11.
249. Section 15 reads as follows:
15.(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrim-
ination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national
or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
15.(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged
individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or. mental or
physical disability.
Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982 ch. 11, sched. B (Constitution Act, 1982).
250. The issue of extinguishment by operation of limitation of actions legislation
will be addressed by the Supreme Court in the Bear Island appeal.
251. Section 2 of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.) 1982 ch. 11, sched. B (Constitution
Act, 1982) reads as follows: "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a)
freedom of conscience and religion; (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and ex-
pression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication; (c) freedom
of peaceful assembly; and (d) freedom of association."
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could argue that the treatment of their human remains as archaeolog-
ical. property and the subject of scientific study offends the equality
provisions of the Charter because their skeletal remains are not pro-
vided the same respect and protection as other skeletal remains.a2
Although there are a few non-Indian burial sites that are excavated
for archaeological purposes, the vast majority of these sites are abo-
riginal burial grounds. Further, it is arguable that the application of
heritage conservation legislation, parks legislation, and limitation of
actions legislation to extinguish or limit access to sacred objects inter-
feres with aboriginal religious practice and are therefore contrary to
the guarantee of freedom of religion.2 3 These arguments would be
subject to the argument that such limitations are justifiable in a free
and democratic society.2 Where claims relate to cultural property that
has been out of the possession of aboriginal persons for a substantial
period of time, private property rationale may be invoked to save the
legislation.
C. Resolution of Disputes
If aboriginal rights to cultural property are not extinguished, what
laws should govern the resolution of disputes: common law principles
of property law, tribal customary law, or both? The choice of law for
the resolution of disputes may depend upon the willingness of the
Supreme Court to recognize political sovereign rights as aboriginal
righis. An examination of the concept of residual sovereignty and
recognition of indigenous traditional laws in the United States provides
a useful illustration of this point. The acceptance of inherent rights in
the United States has lead to the categorization of Indian nations as
"domestic dependent nations."' ' " This means that upon entering trea-
ties, Indian Nations do not cease to be sovereign and self-governing
nations. Rather, powers of government both internal and external to
Indian territory are presumed retained unless surrendered by treaty,
overruled by congressional enactments, or limited by reasonable state
regulation.5 6 As a result, Indian Nations in the United States have the
252. Similar arguments have been made in the United States. See Higginbotham,
supra note 6, at 99-101.
253. Here it must be recognized that native people do not divide their lives into
social, political, cultural, and other dimensions in the same way other Canadians do.
However, the emphasis on the sacred in their claims to cultural artifacts could give rise
to an argument within the scope of constitutional provisions which protect religious
practice. For the application of these arguments in the context of American constitutional
law, see supra notes 4-6.
254. CAN. CoNs. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § I.
255. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
256. Howard R. Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal
History of the United States, 27 BuFF. L. REv. 637 (1978); see John D. Hurley,
Aboriginal Rights, the Constitution, and the Marshall Court, 17 LA REVUE JURDIQUE
Treapys 403 (1982-83); Quebec v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, 1072 (Can.).
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authority to enact and enforce their own property laws within their
own lands.2
7
Tribal laws relating to the sale, disposition, and removal of tribal
property have been applied to determine the legal validity of a property
transaction in competing claims for ownership rights. For example,
where an Indian woman attempted to remove tribal property in vio-
lation of a tribal bylaw preventing sale, disposition, lease, or encum-
brance of any assets of the village without the consent of the tribal
council, the court upheld the tribal law on the "well-established policy-
rule that the courts will not interfere with the internal workings of
Indian tribes."'-5 The court indicated that tribal laws will apply to
tribal members, even where they reside in different states. 59
Where tribal property has been transferred to non-aboriginal persons
residing outside of Indian lands, a mixed approach has been adopted.
In several cases, the validity of the transfer has been analyzed in
accordance with tribal law and the effect of invalidity in accordance
with American law rendering dispositions that violate tribal law inef-
fective.m- Consequently, museums and other potential purchasers of
tribal property in the United States must look to tribal law and custom
to determine whether an Indian transferor can convey title by gift,
sale, devise, or any other manner. 261 It is no defense that an object is
purchased in good faith. Rather, the innocent purchaser's remedy is
against the wrongful seller, not the rightful owner.
Assuming an aboriginal right to tribal property, will the same ap-
proach be adopted in Canada? Historically, Canadian law has denied
the sovereign rights of aboriginal peoples except to the extent that
powers of government have been granted to aboriginal peoples by
federal action and given force by legislation .2 62 However, in May of
1990, the Supreme Court characterized the historical relations between
First Nations and the Crown as nation-to-nation relations. Stating that
Indian nations were recognized in their relations with European nations
that occupied North America as independent nations, the court char-
acterized the historical relationship between Indian nations and the
British Crown as sui generis falling somewhere between "the kind of
relations conducted between sovereign states and the relations that such
states had with their own citizens.'- 263 At first glance, these statements,
coupled with the emphasis on consent to alter treaty rights and limi-
257. Higginbotham, supra note 6, at 110.
258. Johnson v. Chilkat Indian Village, 457 F. Supp. 384, 389 (D. Alaska 1978).
259. Id.
260. See Echo-Hawk, supra note 6, at 441-44.
261. See id. at 443.
262. See, e.g., Eastmain Band v. Gilpin, [1987] 3 C.N.L.R. 54 (Que. Prov. Ct.);
Delguumkw v. A.C.B.C (Mar. 8, 1991) Smithers No. 0843, at 224-25.
263. See Quebec v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, 1038 (Can.).
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tations on occupation theory, suggest a movement toward recognition
of inherent sovereign rights. However, they cannot be read indepen-
dently of the Sparrow decision.
Although Sparrow suggests an inherent rights approach to the def-
inition of aboriginal rights and the blending of Canadian law and
aboriginal traditions in the definition process, the decision does not
extend inherent rights to include sovereign rights. Rather, it affirms
Crown sovereignty over aboriginal peoples and places limitations on
that power by emphasizing fiduciary obligations, the need for clear
and plain language to extinguish aboriginal rights, and the prohibition
of unjustified regulation of aboriginal rights after 1982.
On the question of sovereignty, the court relies on section 91(24) of
the Constitution Act, 1867, to conclude that there was "never any
doubt that sovereignty and legislative power and indeed underlying
title ... vested in the Crown." 2" The impact of this conclusion on
aboriginal claims for sovereignty and the application of tribal law in
the resolution of disputes is uncertain. Perhaps the court is retaining
a contingent rights approach to sovereignty, suggesting that only those
powers recognized and delegated by the federal and provincial Crowns
to aboriginal peoples are enforceable in law.2 65 On the other hand, the
Court's comments may be limited in application to external rights of
sovereignty, leaving room to recognize the continued existence of
internal rights to self-government. This could render the same results
that arise from the recognition of domestic dependent Indian nations
in the United States: the application of tribal laws to tribal members
and the blending of two legal traditions where the rights of non-
aboriginal persons residing outside of Indian territories are at issue.
The conclusion that all sovereign rights have been extinguished can
be attacked on several grounds. First, the conclusion is inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's statement that extinguishment through leg-
islative action must be clear and plain. It is not clear that the intention
of section 91(24) was to extinguish aboriginal rights nor does the
enactment of section 91(24) necessarily imply sovereign rights are
terminated. There is strong support for arguments that the intention
of section 91(24) was simply to centralize the administration of gov-
ernment policy in the federal government at the time of confederation
and not to change the prior practice of consensual surrender of rights.2"
Second, the rejection of internal rights to governance is at odds with
the Court's emphasis on a generous and liberal interpretation of section
35 and the recognition of aboriginal traditions in the definition of
rights. Third, as argued by Asch and Macklam, the contingent rights
264. Regina v. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R. 385, 404 (Can. 1990).
265. See Asch & Macklam, supra note 187, at 508.
266. See supra note 194.
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theory is based on colonial acquisition theory that assumes the superior
rights of European nations. 20
The underlying theory of acquisition is the settlement thesis which
stipulates that discovering European nations acquired title to and
sovereign jurisdiction over unoccupied lands prior to settlement by
colonized nations. For the purposes of applying the theory, Indian
lands were historically treated by Canadian courts as unoccupied lands.
However, it is clear that the courts have completely rejected this theory
in international law.269 Further, in support of maintaining a theory of
contingent rights, Canadian courts have relied on United States deci-
sions describing colonial law and practice which were overruled by the
United States Supreme Court to the extent that they adopt this thesis. 20
It is possible that a different view could emerge from the Canadian
Supreme Court if these arguments were raised.271
If sovereign rights have been extinguished, the resolution of disputes
relating to ownership of cultural property may be governed by prin-
ciples of common law and equity. Likely, the inherent rights approach
will be adopted to determine whether there is a communal or collective
aboriginal right to cultural property claimed by an aboriginal group.
However, the denial of aboriginal sovereignty could result in the need
for expert evidence to support these claims. Further, questions such
as sufficient cultural affiliation of the group and the validity of transfer
of title may be determined by principles of common law unless bylaws
have been passed and approved under the Indian Act or other powers
of control have been recognized or granted by legislation or agreement.
Assuming that limitation of actions legislation does not bar aboriginal
claims, this result will still favor aboriginal peoples as the recognition
of a communal interest in property and the application of nemo dat
logically lead to the conclusion that only the group can transfer valid
title. However, equity could intervene to place conditions on return
compatible with the private property rationale.
If aboriginal sovereignty is accepted, the resolution of disputes could
follow the model of the United States which emphasizes tribal law at
267. See Asch & Macklam, supra note 187, at 508-12.
268. See id.
269. See Western Sahara I.C.J. Reports 6, at 39 (1975); Douglas E. Sanders, The
Re-emergence of Indigenous Questions in International Law, in CANADiA HUMAN
RIoHrs YE.ARBoox 29 (Jean-Denis Archambault & R. Paul Nadin-Davis eds., 1983).
270. Canadian courts rely on the decision of Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823), which upholds the doctrine of discovery as the foundation of Crown
title and sovereignty. This position was reconsidered in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See also Jackson, supra note 194. 271. These arguments have
been raised in Delguumkw v. A.C.B.C. (Mar. 8, 1991) Smithers No. 0843, discussed
supra. The issue will unlikely be resolved until this case makes its way to the Supreme
Court of Canada.
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all levels where property remains in the territorial jurisdiction of the
Indian group or is transferred among members of the group wherever
situated. Once non-aboriginal persons not situated on Indian lands are
involved, a combination of tribal and common law principles may be
applied.
The claim of the Mohawk people against the Glenbow-Alberta In-
stitute during the "Spirit Sings" controversy is an example of a
repatriation claim based on aboriginal and sovereign rights. In their
claim, the plaintiffs assert that they have an aboriginal right to their
own customs, cultures, traditions, spiritual and other values, and
beliefs and practice of the same. Noting that the Mohawk Nation has
never been conquered, has maintained its sovereignty, and has always
had its own laws, the statement of claim argues that the Mohawk
people own the cultural property at issue and the disposition and
display of that property is in violation of Mohawk traditions and law.
Consequently, it was illegally appropriated, converted, and is being
wrongfully retained by the Glenbow-Alberta Institute. The plaintiffs
draw on Mohawk law and Canadian law to support their claim. The
Court of Queen's Bench accepted that the Mohawk pleadings evidenced
a serious issue to be tried but failed to grant an interim injunction
for the return of the property for reasons already discussed supra. The
matter never proceeded to trial and is yet to be brought before
Canadian courts.
Regardless of the Supreme Court's position on the retention of
sovereignty, the blending of two traditions in the resolution of disputes
remains a viable alternative in Canadian law. Although Sparrow seems
to exclude aboriginal sovereignty in favor of Crown sovereignty, what
may happen is an infusion of tribal and Canadian law in the inter-
pretation and protection of aboriginal rights. It is clear that in some
respects tribal custom is becoming a source of interpretation of section
35. Rather than adopting an "either/or" approach and focusing on
competing sovereignties, Sparrow provides a mechanism for blending
both traditions and recognizing a full range of rights. It is the will-
ingness of the court to adopt a fresh, culturally sensitive perspective
and not the security of Canadian sovereignty which is the real issue
in determining the laws which will govern future claims.
VI. Conclusion
Relying only on principles of common law, the likelihood of a
successful repatriation claim is slim. Revisions to the common law by
limitation of actions legislation and heritage conservation schemes
provide security of title in present custodians of aboriginal cultural
property acquired either more than two years ago or after the enact-
ment of the ownership provisions in heritage conservation legislation.
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However, this article has illustrated that recent developments in the
law of aboriginal rights now cast serious doubt on the security of
museum title and title of other custodians of aboriginal cultural prop-
erty where such property is viewed as collective property and has been
disposed of by individuals. Given the complexity and cultural sensitivity
of this issue, it is essential that governments and museums work in
cooperation with aboriginal peoples to resolve issues concerning the
management, care, and custody of cultural patrimony. A failure to do
so will result in lengthy and costly litigation, to the detriment of all
interested parties.
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